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Abstract 
Estimates from the World Wind Energy Association assert that world total wind power 
installed capacity climbed from 18 Gigawatt (GW) to 152 GW from 2000 to 2009. Moreover, 
according to their predictions, by the end of 2010 global wind power capacity will reach 190 
GW. Since electricity is a unique commodity, this remarkable expansion brings forward 
several key economic questions regarding the integration of significant amount of wind 
power capacity into deregulated electricity markets. 
The overall dissertation objective is to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework that 
enables the modeling of the performance and outcome of wind-integrated electricity markets. 
This is relevant because the state of knowledge of modeling electricity markets is insufficient 
for the purpose of wind power considerations. First, there is a need to decide about a 
consistent representation of deregulated electricity markets. Surprisingly, the related body of 
literature does not agree on the very economic basics of modeling electricity markets. That is 
important since we need to capture the fundamentals of electricity markets before we 
introduce wind power to our study. For example, the structure of the electric industry is a 
key. If market power is present, the integration of wind power has large consequences on 
welfare distribution. Since wind power uncertainty changes the dynamics of information it 
also impacts the ability to manipulate market prices. This is because the quantity supplied by 
wind energy is not a decision variable. Second, the intermittent spatial nature of wind over a 
geographical region is important because the market value of wind power capacity is derived 
xiii 
 
 
from its statistical properties. Once integrated into the market, the distribution of wind will 
impact the price of electricity produced from conventional sources of energy. Third, although 
wind power forecasting has improved in recent years, at the time of trading short-term 
electricity forwards, forecasting precision is still low. Therefore, it is crucial that the 
uncertainty in forecasting wind power is considered when modeling trading behavior. 
Our theoretical framework is based on finding a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium in 
double-sided auctions in both forwards and spot electricity markets. The theoretical 
framework allows for the first time, to the best of our knowledge, a model of electricity 
markets that explain two main empirical findings; the existence of forwards premium and 
spot market mark-ups. That is a significant contribution since so far forward premiums have 
been explained exclusively by the assumption of risk-averse behavior while spot mark-ups 
are the outcome of the body of literature assuming oligopolistic competition. 
In the next step, we extend the theoretical framework to account for deregulated electricity 
markets with wind power. Modeling a wind-integrated electricity market allows us to analyze 
market outcomes with respect to three main factors; the introduction of uncertainty from the 
supply side, ownership of wind power capacity and the geographical diversification of wind 
power capacity. 
For the purpose of modeling trade in electricity forwards one should simulate the information 
agents have regarding future availability of aggregate wind power. This is particularly 
important for modeling accurately traders’ ability to predict the spot price distribution. We 
develop a novel numerical methodology for the simulation of the conditional distribution of 
regional wind power at the time of trading short-term electricity forwards. 
xiv 
 
 
Finally, we put the theoretical framework and the numerical methodology developed in this 
study to work by providing a detailed computational experiment examining electricity market 
outcomes for a particular expansion path of wind power capacity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and literature review 
 
Problem statement 
Wind power has been recently established as a major source of renewable energy. The rapid 
increase in wind power generation worldwide introduces two central challenges to the 
electric industry. One is the physical aspect of connecting a large amount of intermittent new 
power capacity to the grid.  The other is how to incorporate trade in wind power and how it 
will affect the price of electricity from other energy sources in a deregulated market. 
Technically, transmission system planners seem to be able to identify and to take steps to 
relieve bottlenecks to integration of wind power such that system reliability is not 
compromised. In contrast, the impact of wind power on electricity market dynamics and 
welfare distribution has not yet been studied comprehensively. A better understanding of the 
new economic environment of wind-integrated electricity markets is essential for future 
energy policy designs. 
Public good aspects such as reducing dependency on fossil fuel and reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions are often the grounds for governments to support renewable energy. Yet, when 
the percentage of renewable energy and particularly that of wind power increases, the impact 
on electricity markets should be considered as well. Therefore, a fundamental question is 
how market participants respond to an increasing supply of intermittent energy source. In 
markets that make use of forward contracts as their primary pricing tool, how does increased 
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wind power penetration affect trading behavior? It is therefore necessary to investigate how 
the entire electricity market is affected, rather than just the economics of wind power, in 
order to analyze the value of wind power to producers, consumers and the subsequent 
welfare effects. 
At present, wholesale electricity markets make use of the uniform price auction mechanism 
to administer trade in electricity. This mechanism promotes efficiency by encouraging power 
producers and consumers to bid their marginal costs and marginal willingness to pay 
respectively. Wind power producers on the other hand, are not obliged to do so, and typically 
do not participate in these markets. Instead, wind power is utilized whenever it is available in 
real-time and wind power producers are compensated at the settled uniform auction price. 
This arrangement may perform well where wind power has a small market share, but for 
higher penetration rates it may cause market distortions and deviations from efficient 
allocation of energy resources. Moreover, wind power is unique because its marginal cost is 
close to zero, thus its revenues are extremely sensitive to how and when electricity is traded. 
Therefore, investigating the performances of electricity markets in conjunction with the 
expansion of wind power capacity is a key research question.  
 
Liberalized electricity markets 
For over a decade electric industries worldwide have transitioned from a regulated to a more 
liberalized structure. Under a monopoly regime, vertically integrated companies control the 
generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in a broad geographical area.  A 
regulator would guaranty the monopoly a fixed rate per unit of service in an attempt to 
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deduce (and not overestimate) its average cost. For many years electricity generation and 
distribution have been operated as natural monopolies due to economies of scale. However, 
recent technological advances in power generation have weakened the belief that the 
advantages of economies of scale outweigh the potential benefits of a liberalized market.  
In a deregulated electricity market, a monopoly utility is replaced by several independent 
entities, including independent power producers (IPPs), load serving entities (LSEs) and a 
system operator. IPPs are generation companies that produce and sell power in the 
deregulated electricity markets. LSEs are a typical buyer in those markets. These firms must 
purchase electricity to meet real-time demand of their consumers. The system operator’s role 
is to accommodate the unique features of electricity. Two key technical peculiarities of 
electricity make it a unique commodity. First, it cannot be stored economically. Thus any 
unconsumed quantity is lost. Second, electricity requires a transmission system which means 
that some degree of coordination and/or regulation by a system operator needs to be in place. 
Examples include independent system operators (ISO) or regional transmission organizations 
(RTO)1. In addition, electricity is an essential commodity. Thus, there are large welfare 
losses from any failure in the market from inadequate supplies. Power systems need to 
operate reliably at all times and timely investments in capacity must be made to meet 
growing demand. The function of the system operator is a key in any market structure 
implementation. For that reason, deregulation in electric industries has been limited to power 
generation and retailing. More about the challenges and experiences related to the transition 
to liberalized market itself are discussed elsewhere (Griffin and Puller 2005). 
                                                          
1
 ISOs and RTOs are independent and nonprofit organizations which have as their primary role managing power 
transmissions, reliability and efficiency of the power system. 
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Wholesale electricity markets 
In a liberalized electricity sector a competitive wholesale market is developed and operated 
by the system operator or some other entity that does not otherwise participate in the market 
for electricity.  The main functions of electricity exchanges are to accommodate trade and 
balance real-time operations. Short term electricity trade is usually organized as two-
settlement processes: the day-ahead market and the real-time or spot markets. Market 
participants submit their bids and market price is determined according to the type of auction 
system adopted by the market administrator. In the U.S. and most electricity exchanges a 
uniform pricing auction is implemented in which the price of the marginal traded unit of 
electricity determines the market price. This mechanism is considered competitive as long as 
the number of market participants is large enough to eliminate the possibility of market 
power and strategic biddings. Under this circumstance the market price represents an 
efficient allocation of power generator resources. Unfortunately, this is usually not the case. 
The electric industry is often concentrated and the unique characteristics of electricity 
commodity contribute to the ability of generators to exercise market power. This is mainly 
due to an inelastic demand and the fact that electricity cannot be stored economically. 
There are several other commodities that are traded in the deregulated electricity markets 
including financial transmission rights, reserve capacity and ancillary services. We discuss 
these only briefly because they are not directly related to our research problem. Financial 
transmission rights are traded to hedge the cost component of electricity prices which is 
caused by congestion of transmission lines. The market for reserved capacity is where firms 
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compete for investments in new power generation to accommodate future increase in 
demand. Ancillary services are traded as complementary commodities to spot power. The 
purpose of these services is to help maintain the security and the quality of the supply of 
electricity in real-time. The main categories of ancillary services traded are frequency and 
voltage control and backup and restoration capacity. Ancillary power that are traded are 
reserve power of different types, reactive power and backup power. The markets for ancillary 
services often consist of auctions but are fundamentally different from the spot market. 
Ancillary services are provided by different generators than those participating in the spot 
market. Also, most of the time ancillary power is not generated, but when it is, the cost of 
input fuel is relatively high and efficiency level is extremely low.  
The exchanges play a significant role in promoting the competitiveness of the market. As a 
coordination device, the exchanges publish real-time market information, weather forecasts, 
load forecasts and recently there is a growing trend to adopt central wind forecast systems as 
well. These transparencies are crucial for efficient decision making in all traded electricity 
goods. 
 
Modeling electricity prices  
Models of how electricity is priced are used to value generation assets, financial transmission 
rights, and the pricing of electricity derivatives. This section discusses the different 
approaches that have been used to model electricity prices and reviews recent quantitative 
methods. Electricity prices have been modeled as either stochastic processes or as arising 
from the interaction of fundamental supply and demand curves. The most frequent approach 
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used is to model electricity prices as a stochastic process.  In this approach historical price 
data are used to infer the properties of future electricity prices. The second class of models 
attempts to model fundamental attributes of electricity supply and demand to infer future 
price behavior. This class includes engineering and equilibrium based models. 
 
Stochastic approach 
Pure stochastic models include continuous-time diffusion models and discrete-time 
autoregressive models. While both focus on modeling the movement of prices, time series 
models may also include some features of the market. Neither offers much insight into the 
fundamental economic forces and market operation that affect prices. Stochastic models are 
most valuable for pricing derivatives in electricity markets where the stochastic properties of 
prices are the main interest. 
 
Diffusion models 
A typical approach to modeling prices is to assume that they follow Geometric Brownian 
Motion process as follows:  
 	
  
  
 (1.1) 
where 
 is the price of electricity at time ,  is a drift rate,  is volatility and  is a 
standard Brownian motion process increment. 
Taking the natural log of 
 guarantees non-negative prices and implies that price is log 
normally distributed if the movement in price is normally distributed (Lucia and Schwartz 
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2002; Tseng and Barz 2002). The price movement is often formulated as a mean reversion 
processes by defining the drift parameter as:  
   	  
 (1.2) 
where  is a mean reversion parameter, often referred as the degree of storability of the 
commodity under investigation. For a storable commodity, this parameter will be small. But 
it will be large in the case of electricity because electricity is quite costly to store. The 
parameter   captures the cyclical feature of seasonal fluctuations (Denton, et al. 2003). 
Although very simple and convenient, these models fail to replicate spikes in electricity spot 
markets. The simplest way to overcome this weakness is to introduce a jump component 
within this framework (Clewlow and Strickland 2000; Knittel and Roberts 2005; Cartea and 
Figueroa 2005). Then the model becomes   
 	
  	  

  
  
 (1.3) 
where  is a Poisson process.  
The extended model generates price spikes but fails to mimic the dynamics of their 
occurrence successfully. The Poisson component introduces an isolated and independent 
jump. In reality, jumps in electricity prices behave differently. Spikes tend to occur in a 
cyclical manner and not as a purely random event with a probability of occurrence. Also, in 
reality a sudden spike in electricity prices is often followed by a rapid price decrease caused 
by generators being turned on to meet the temporary shortage.  Excess supply often follows 
immediately. 
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The Markov regime switching model is an approach that replicates spikes in a more realistic 
fashion (Elliott, Sick and Stein 2003; Huisman and Mahieu 2003). In this model price 
movements are separated into ‘normal’ periods as in equation (1.1) and ‘spiky’ periods 
described by 
 	
  
  
 . (1.4) 
While equation (1.1) characterizes the price movement in ‘normal’ periods, equation (1.4) 
employs  as oppose to  to describe the drift in ‘spiky’ periods. The switch in this case is 
governed by a standard 2 by 2 conditional probability matrix. 
Other diffusion models were constructed specifically to accommodate the particular nature of 
electricity. These are more mathematically involved and go beyond ordinary commodity 
price modeling (e.g. Deng 2000, and Geman and Roncoroni 2006). Their mathematical 
description is superior and offer a better fit for electricity price behavior. 
 
Time series models 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) models are the 
workhorse of discrete time models of electricity prices (Byström 2005; Garcia, et al. 2005; 
Goto and Karolyi 2004; Longstaff and Wang 2004; Mount, Ning and Cai 2006). The classic 
model is defined as  
 
  c   
   !"ε"  ε$
%
&  (1.5) 
where 
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 '  ( )⁄ +,    +~..	0,1 
and  (  1  ∑ 3"'") 4" ∑ 5"(6   . (1.6) 
Imposing the required stationarity and non-negativity conditions guaranty mean reversion in 
electricity prices. Volatility persistence is generated by the structure of the error term '; 
current volatility is explained partially by past volatility. Applications of the model often 
incorporate variables for seasonal effects, weekend/weekday and holiday’s effects, time of 
the day effects, jumps in variance and variance clustering. 
 
Fundamental approach 
The fundamental approach for modeling electricity prices accounts for the costs of supplying 
electricity, the demand for electricity and the behavior of electricity market participants. 
While both engineers and economists use this approach, their purpose and thereby the focus 
and methodology is quite different. 
 
Engineering based models 
The engineering approach attempts to include all relevant forces in power generation to 
estimate the nominal cost of electricity production. Major input data considered are 
characteristics of technologies, input prices, physical and power security constraints, 
transmission system operation, congestion issues, and energy demand. Then, particular 
figures are utilized in different scenarios to assign the computed cost of production for given 
conditions. This approach refers mainly to the algorithm developed and implemented by a 
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system operator (i.e. ISO or RTO) but may also be employed for studying the aggregate 
industry profile (Huang and Wu 2008) or adoption of new technology (Bakos 2002). 
 
Equilibrium price models  
Equilibrium models examine the relationship among economic drivers in market operation to 
describe market equilibrium and prices in particular. Behavior of market participants such as 
IPPs and LSEs are crucial for understanding the evolution of market prices. Here, the models 
describe the main properties of the market instead of stating the actual engineering figures 
explicitly. For instance, representing production cost as a convex function can incorporate the 
fundamental cost structure faced by power generators. Assuming 8 identical producers, 
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) introduced the following cost function:  
 9:  ;  <= 	>?@ , .  1 … 8 (1.7) 
where ; represents a fixed cost, >? is the volume produced by producer ., B is a constant 
greater or equal to two and C is a parameter. This simple representation implies that the 
industry is characterized by increasing marginal cost. It is realistic because producers employ 
different technologies types according to >? and the need to meet demand. Employing 
economic theory and market data (to calibrate parameters) provides a transparent framework 
for further economic analysis. An extension of the above cost function was proposed by 
Suenaga and Williams (2005). They replaced the parameter C with stochastic fuel prices 
which enabled them to explore the input-output price relationships in power generating. 
Finding equilibrium electricity prices requires consideration of demand (Barlow 2002; 
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Vehviläinen and Pyykkönen 2005). In these models demand is characterized as stochastic 
while supply is not. In Barlow (2002) prices are determined by the interaction of consumers’ 
willingness to pay and an unspecified, fully responsive, supply side. In Vehviläinen and 
Pyykkönen (2005) demand is completely inelastic and prices are determined by the marginal 
production cost of the marginal generating unit.  
A recent study explains the evolution of prices by defining both demand and capacity (D and 
:, respectively) as state variables (Cartea and Villaplana 2008). The chosen spot price 
formula is 
 
  EFGHIJK and , E L 0, 5 M 0 . (1.8) 
Imposing the signs of the parameters guarantees that prices increase with demand and 
decrease with capacity. The state variables are composed from deterministic and stochastic 
components: 
 N  O"	  P" , Q  :, D . (1.9) 
The diffusion process is described as mean reverting and follows standard Brownian motion:  
 P"  R"P"  "S" . (1.10) 
The model links demand and capacity with spot prices in a technical way and does not offer 
any fundamental economic interpretation. The model assumes that the stochastic parts of the 
state variables are independent which implies that traders do not respond to price changes. 
This assumption contradicts the basis of a competitive market operation. LSEs are contracted 
to supply any realized demand. Thus they are not price responsive. However, IPPs are able to 
respond to market prices by making capacity adjustments. For example, in the long run 
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investments are made to meet anticipated electricity demand growth. The short run response 
is characterized by frequent startups and shut downs of peaking plants to accommodate load 
spikes. 
 
Modeling oligopoly equilibrium 
Empirical studies examining the performances of deregulated electricity markets find high 
price-cost margins, which suggest the presence of market power in these markets (e.g. 
Borenstein and Bushnell 1999, Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak 2002, Green 1999, Mansur 
2008, Puller 2007 and Wolfram 1999). If power producers are able to exercise market power, 
models of oligopoly pricing should be employed instead of those assuming perfectly 
competitive behavior. Natural candidates for a non-cooperative game are the Cournot and the 
Bertrand models. In the former firms compete in quantities while the latter describes 
competition in prices. In the Bertrand equilibrium the firm that prices its output below its 
rival’s will be the only supplier of the good in the market. This framework is not suitable for 
modeling electricity market since the supposition that a single firm in a deregulated 
electricity market can supply overall load is unlikely. In addition, the cost function of 
generating power is known to be convex thus negating the equilibrium characterized by a 
Bertrand model.   
An IPP acting as a Cournot competitor chooses its own quantity taking the quantities of its 
rivals as given. In doing so, each IPP is aware of the impact of its own production level on 
the market price. Nash equilibrium in this game is reached where all IPPs simultaneously 
choose profit maximizing quantities. In the case of electricity markets the outcome of 
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applying a standard Cournot model usually tends to overestimate market power. First, the 
Cournot is essentially a static short-run model which does not consider entry and exit of 
firms. Yet, electricity markets are characterized by repeated games at which in each hour spot 
market is being cleared. Since supernormal profits encourage the entry of new firms, 
incumbents may not be able to exercise market power up to the Cournot equilibrium. 
Secondly, the standard Cournot framework does not consider forward contracts. This is 
limiting since forward contracts are the main pricing tool in electricity markets. Moreover, 
Allaz and Vila (1993) show that the presence of contracts in a Cournot setting drives 
suppliers to act more competitively in the spot market and move away from the Cournot 
equilibrium.  
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) is another oligopolistic modeling approach that is 
frequently being used in studying electricity markets. This is a theoretical framework 
developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and employed for modeling electricity market in 
Green and Newbery (1992) and others. In this single settlement model suppliers bid supply 
curves rather than price-quantity pairs. Since most deregulated markets are governed by 
uniform price auctions, the SFE setting describes actual IPP behavior more closely than the 
Cournot and other models. Unfortunately, the solution of a SFE approach is characterized by 
multiple equilibria. Interestingly, the range of solutions of SFE is bounded between the 
Bertrand outcome from below (the competitive solution) and the static Cournot outcome 
from above. The range of possible equilibrium may be narrowed down by capacity 
constraints, entry and market for contracts (Green 1999; Green and Newbery 1992; Newbery 
1998). Under extreme conditions the SFE model may produce unique equilibrium; this 
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however is very limiting and almost impractical from an applied point of view2. For example, 
as pointed out by Newbery (1998) incorporating an SFE model to account for both forward 
and spot markets will generate double infinity number of equilibria. Similar to the Cornout 
model, this is a considerable downside since spot power is being traded in the two-settlement 
process (day-ahead and a spot market) in most deregulated electricity markets. 
Another shortcoming of the oligopolistic modeling approach is the lack of a realistic 
representation of consumers’ behavior. Both Cournot and SFE models employ a demand 
curve (usually linear) to represent real-time load. Doing so, they fail to describe the 
optimization problem of LSEs. Since LSEs aggregate large number of consumers and 
participate in forward markets, the evolution of demand in each of these markets should be 
accounted for as well. Kian, Cruz and Thomas (2005) proposed a model of double-sided 
auctions for spot power. They develop bidding strategies for IPPs and LSEs in a dynamic 
system. Their study suggests that a double sided auction is a more realistic modeling 
approach. That is because it accounts for the demand side responses to the strategies 
employed by the supply side. As a result, the outcome of the double-sided auction is more 
efficient than a single sided auction. 
An alternative approach to the oligopoly framework is to assume that agents have learning 
capabilities. Sun and Tesfatsion (2007) developed a computational model to examine the 
performance of a wholesale power market. The model is based on strictly buyers and strictly 
sellers of power (i.e. LSEs and IPPs respectively) and a system operator. A dynamic 5-node 
                                                          
2
 Sufficient conditions for uniqueness in SFE model are symmetry, unbounded upper support of uncertainty, 
linear demand and marginal costs   
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transmission grid is assumed for concrete illustration. Unlike other economic models, by 
incorporating the power system, Sun and Tesfatsion are able to model locational marginal 
prices. These prices reflect the least cost of meeting additional megawatt demand at a certain 
node. Electricity trading is assumed to take place at the two-settlement process of day-ahead 
and real-time markets. However, the demand side is not studied in Sun and Tesfatsion 
(2007). Instead, it is assumed that LSEs submit electricity demand which is identical to load 
forecasts thus no optimization from their side is considered. The IPPs predict the state of 
the power system to develop strategic biddings. Under this setup, the model shows that if 
power generators have learning capabilities they may exercise their potential market power 
and bid strategically. As a result they obtain higher profits. 
      
Electricity derivatives 
Uncertain demand, non-storability and a time sensitive cost structure of power generation are 
the main sources of the volatility in electricity spot market. The exposure to sometimes-
extreme price volatility can be costly to both LSEs (buyers) and IPPs (sellers). Various 
financial and physical instruments for hedging price risk in electricity markets have been 
developed and implemented. Among these, forwards and futures contracts are the simplest 
and the most popular. Both contracts are an agreement to buy or sell electricity at a specified 
price for a particular delivery period. They differ however in the way they are traded, their 
volume, and in their specificity. Futures contracts are traded in the organized exchanges 
while forwards are traded bilaterally over the counter. Futures are highly standardized 
contracts traded in low volume. Forward contracts are sold as blocks tailored to fit on/off 
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peak load time of any future period at any predetermined location. In the U.S., electricity 
futures contracts are traded currently only in the Minnesota Grain Exchange. Other 
exchanges decided to delist them due to low interest. In Europe, electricity futures contracts 
are traded more frequently.  
Typically, LSEs and IPPs manage a portfolio of electricity derivatives which are being traded 
in different occasions prior to the delivery period in question and according to market 
conditions and updated demand forecasts. Taking a forward position decreases the exposure 
of buyers and sellers to spot market volatility. The next section discusses the role of futures 
and forward contracts in electricity market risk management. A detailed review of a variety 
of electricity derivatives is given by Deng and Oren (2006). 
 
Risk management 
Electricity demand in wholesale electricity markets is represented by LSEs. These firms are 
contractually obligated to meet any volumetric demand of their end-consumers’ at all times. 
Coupled with spot price volatility this demand-fulfillment requirement makes them 
extremely exposed to short run losses. Electricity is a non-storable commodity and as such 
the convenient no-arbitrage approach cannot be applied for hedging its price risk in futures 
markets. Instead, the distribution of electricity prices may be inferred, and then the prices of 
futures contracts (and other electricity derivatives) can be computed to comply with a no-
arbitrage in expectations principle. 
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Power producers would be interested in revenue certainty to allow steady cash flow, enable 
timely investments and preserve firm credit rating and reputation. These circumstances make 
forwards and futures contracts essential devices to control risk for both LSEs and IPPs. The 
demand for future contracts and the evolution of their prices have been studied extensively. 
A conventional starting point for these studies is based on two key assumptions; one is 
related to the behavior of agents in this market and the other is about the stochastic linkage 
between electricity prices and demand. First, the demand for hedging instruments is 
motivated by Markowitz’s portfolio model in that buyers and sellers want to diversify their 
procurements/sales to achieve higher expected utility by trading off mean profits for 
reductions in variance. Then, an assumption about the particular joint distribution of price 
and load follows, and is used to optimize a portfolio. For example, both Woo, Horowitz and 
Karimov (2004), and Oum, Oren and Deng (2006) assume a concave LSE objective function 
and derive an optimal frontier of futures holding. Employing constant absolute risk aversion 
and mean-variance functions, the portfolios represent the optimal tradeoff between 
procurement cost expectation and cost variance. Woo, Horowitz and Karimov exemplified an 
efficient portfolio for the case that overall procurement cost is assumed to be normally 
distributed. Oum, Oren and Deng investigated cases which price and load demonstrate 
bivariate normal or log-normal distributions. Mean-variance objective have been employed 
to construct the corresponding efficient frontier for power producers (Bjorgan, Liu and 
Lawarree 1999). Acknowledging that variance of profits penalizes realizations of over and 
under expected value at the same rate, Paravan, Sheble and Golob (2004) solve the power 
portfolio optimization problem where the variance of profits is replaced by the conditional 
value at risk. That is the expected value of loss given a realization of a certain outcome. A 
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parallel approach for an LSE firm is presented in Woo, Karimov and Horowitz (2004) where 
the objective is to minimize expected procurement cost subject to a cost exposure constraint. 
By imposing exogenous price distributions, the studies above can be viewed as a partial 
equilibrium approach for risk. A general equilibrium modeling of electricity market is rare 
due to the intricate feature of this market. Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) developed a 
general equilibrium model where both quantity and price of forwards are determined 
endogenously. This study is unique in its effort to describe the complexity of electricity 
market essentials based on classic economic theory. It is considered to be a benchmark for 
economic-based modeling under the assumption of perfectly competitive electricity markets. 
Bessembinder and Lemmon assume that the settled price of a forward contract is based 
mainly on the expectations of the spot market price. Storage and risk related to the nature of 
the traded commodity are generally determinants in forwards markets as well. In the case of 
electricity, storage is economically irrelevant (excluding hydroelectricity), but risk may play 
an important role.  
Start by assuming that both LSEs and IPPs decision making is based on the following mean-
variance objective functions  
 +TU	V, WCX	VY  U	V  Z2 WCX	V (1.11) 
where V is profits and the parameter Z is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Note that 
this representation is equivalent to assuming that utility is exponential and profits are 
normally distributed.  
The non-hedged profits of a representative IPP and LSE respectively are  
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>  9:	> and V]^_  >	
`  
 (1.12) 
where 9: is the total cost defined in equation (1.7), 
 and > are the spot price and realized 
demand respectively. 
`  is the predetermined fixed retail price per unit of electricity.  
One can show that the optimal forward position for the mean-variance objective function of 
both LSE and IPP can be written as
 
 >a\??,]^_bc  
c  U	
ZWCX	
  :d+eVa\??,]^_b, 
fWCX	
  . (1.13) 
The first term is driven by the bias of the forward price 
c compare to the expected spot 
price. The second term is the optimal condition for minimizing the variance of profits.  
Solving the model, Bessembinder and Lemmon show that the equilibrium volume and the 
forward price can be written as functions of the first, second and third moments of the 
distribution of the spot price. Next, they establish the result that in general the forward price 
is a biased forecast of the spot price. The risk premium which is defined as the forward 
contract price minus the expected spot price is increasing in the skewness and decreasing in 
the variance of spot price. That is, in peak load periods that are characterized by high 
expected demand and a high variance in demand, the risk premium will be high due to the 
convex nature of generating cost. In lower demand periods, lower skewness pushes risk 
premiums down. 
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Another study provides an empirical analysis based on the theory presented above (Longstaff 
and Wang 2004). Data from the PJM3 electricity market support the predictions of 
Bessembinder and Lemmon and implies that an economic-based model is capable of 
explaining the formation of electricity markets prices. 
 
Electricity from renewable resources 
Diversification of energy sources and climate change mitigation have been the major grounds 
for the growing interest in energy from renewable resources. Higher energy prices coupled 
with technological advances in harvesting renewable energy enhanced this interest. 
Renewable energy resources include wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, hydro4, landfill gas, 
and others. Many countries have introduced mandates for renewable energy. For instance, the 
European Union set an overall binding target of 20% by 2020, though the percentage varies 
greatly within union members. Australia set 20% by the year 2020 as well. In the U.S. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) have been established by 25 states and the District of 
Columbia but no national policy has been set. Targets, percentages, timetables, and the 
energy resources to be used vary among states. Targets are specified as percentages of 
overall power generation capacity or as annual energy volumes produced5. Another support 
for renewable energy is given in a form of a tax credit and renewable energy certificates, 
which are granted for generating energy from qualified renewable resources. They are traded 
                                                          
3
 PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization (RTO) in the U.S. that coordinates the movement 
of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia. 
4
 Hydroelectric power produced in a pumped-storage facility is usually considered as a non-renewable resource 
as pumping requires energy that comes mainly from fossil fuel generators. 
5
 U.S. state level RPS can be accessed at the American Wind Energy Association website at: 
http://www.awea.org/legislative/pdf/State%20RPS%20factsheet%20Nov%202007.pdf 
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separately from electricity and can provide a supplementary source of income to producers of 
renewable energy. 
 
Integrating wind power  
Integrating renewable energy into the wholesale electricity market is a challenging task. 
Unlike conventional power units, renewable energy can fluctuate over time because output 
depends on precipitation, radiant energy and air flows which are uncertain by nature. Their 
variable nature means that renewable energy cannot be marketed in the same way that 
conventional power is marketed. We focus here on wind power as its variability makes it the 
most difficult energy resource to integrate into the power system (IRC 2007). In addition, 
U.S. wind power capacity has been rapidly growing as shown in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: U.S. overall wind power capacity 
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The large increase in wind power shown in figure 1 suggests that it will be useful to better 
understand how wind power will impact the power generation industry. The engineering 
implications of grid connection and reliable transmission of wind power are being studied, 
discussed and improved on an ongoing basis (Jauch, et al. 2005; Söder, et al. 2006). In 
particular, both short run and long run reserve requirements need to be re-evaluated because 
an increasing share of wind power makes quantification of system reserves more complex. 
Short run reserves are used to account for real-time load forecasting errors and generator 
outages. Long run reserve refers to the adequacy of overall power capacity of a region to 
meet demand6. When the share of wind power is small, the overall amount of variability that 
is added to a power system is small. Hence both types of reserve requirements are not 
significantly altered. When wind has a 10% share, the increase in short term reserve is 
estimated in the range of 2-8% of total installed wind power capacity (Holttinen and 
Hirvonen 2005). In terms of overall installed capacity, the capacity credit for wind in low 
penetration rates is equivalent to that of conventional power units but diminishes at higher 
rates. The reason for this is that in low penetration rates the variability of wind power 
production is within the range that short run reserves can handle without further adjustments. 
As wind power share increases, the ability of these reserves to account for possible sudden 
drops of wind power is reduced thus long run reserves have to be added. Moreover, at a 
certain point, capacity credit does not increase with the addition of more wind turbines to the 
region.  
                                                          
6
 Capacity calculation of wind power for planning reserve varies greatly. In some regions a fixed proportion of 
15% -20% of turbine’s rated power is used. When applicable, historical data is utilized to compute empirical 
capacity factor based on performances. In other regions the capacity evaluation is based only on peak load 
periods.   
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A study by Doherty and O'Malley (2005) introduce a novel method to compute reserve 
requirements for high shares of wind power capacity regime. The study shows that long term 
capacity adjustments are more substantial relative to the short term requirements. Short term 
reserve requirements are increasing, but they are fairly low because intra hour wind variation 
is small relative to overall load variation. However, categories of reserve that act over longer 
periods of time have to expand with the introduction of more wind power. 
 
Wind forecasting 
Wind power value is strongly influenced by the precision of wind speed forecasting. A high 
quality forecast enables a system operator to schedule wind power to displace conventional 
generators and minimize ancillary services costs. With regard to the operation of electricity 
markets, accurate information about wind power availability promotes efficiency in trade. 
Unfortunately, small wind speed prediction errors are translated into large ones when it 
comes to wind power predictions, as will be explained in detail in chapter three. Thus, wind 
energy prediction is not a simple task and still produces relatively inaccurate predictions 
when predictions are made for more than several hours ahead.  
Wind speed predictions for more than several days ahead are performed by numerical 
weather prediction (NWP) models. These are developed by meteorologists and generate 
predictions in low resolutions for large areas. Predictions for up to two days-ahead are 
commonly governed by physical, statistical or combinations of these two methods. Physical 
methods utilize the predictions of NWP models as inputs and consider the physical local 
wind conditions of smaller areas to enhance predictions. For short term predictions (hours to 
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one day-ahead), statistical models are more suitable. In particular, time series models have 
been developed to improve predictions (El-Fouly, El-Saadany and Salama 2008; Sánchez 
2006; Torres, et al. 2005). 
The short term prediction of wind speed for power generation purposes is being improved 
over time. Yet, according to a recent study absolute mean error in the case of day-ahead 
prediction is still 25%-30% of actual output. An hour-ahead prediction of a single site 
incorporates an approximately 10%-15% absolute mean error (Smith 2008). 
When forecasting aggregate wind power in a region, prediction errors are reduced because of 
aggregation of forecast errors. Smith (2008) reports that the day-ahead forecasting errors in a 
region are 15%-18% and the hour figures fall to 6%-11%. Forecasting aggregate wind power 
has to take into account the spatial correlation of wind speed in the region. If wind speed is 
strongly correlated over space, reductions in prediction errors would be limited compared to 
the case of weak correlation. Employing spatial statistics models, it was shown that the 
decrease in prediction error is related to the size of the geographical area considered rather 
than the number of wind farm sites in a region (Focken, et al. 2002; Holttinen 2005). Because 
spatial correlation limits the smoothing effects proposed by a large area, the reduction in the 
errors of aggregate prediction are not unbounded. 
Central wind forecasting systems have been developed and adopted on an ongoing basis in 
some regions. Some of these systems are still experimental or in a pilot stage while others are 
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already being practiced7. Besides offering the most accurate predictions to market 
participants, central systems support the competitiveness of electricity markets. The presence 
of central forecasting system in a market makes the frontier of wind power predictions 
common knowledge and promotes market coordination. 
In most deregulated electricity markets in the U.S. bidding wind power in the day-ahead 
markets is allowed. But in practice, wind power producers usually do not participate in this 
market. Instead, their energy is taken into the system and transmitted whenever it is 
available. Since the marginal cost of wind power generation is zero, it is most efficient to 
utilize all applicable wind energy before dispatching other generators. Introducing wind 
power to the system only in real-time minimizes the short term reserve requirements for wind 
power integration. By doing that, power systems operators avoid the errors involved in 
forecasting wind power for more than an hour-ahead. Then, wind power producers are 
compensated at the equilibrium price determined by conventional supply units and demand 
forces.  
Imprecise day-ahead forecasting of wind power and financial penalties levied on deviation 
from supply commitments discourage wind producers from participating as players in the 
day-ahead markets8. In cases in which the wind power producer is defined as a capacity 
resource in a region, he receives capacity market revenues but has an obligation to schedule 
its capacity value in the day-ahead market. 
                                                          
7
 Some operating forecasting systems are in Alberta Electronic SO, California ISO and ERCOT. NY ISO uses 
persistence forecasting. 
8
 In the U.S. energy imbalance charges may apply if energy deliveries differ by more than +/- 1.5% from their 
day-ahead schedule. 
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Previous work and the contribution of this study 
Price modeling has been studied extensively in the deregulated electricity markets era. 
Stochastic based approaches have generated models of high precision. Advanced models 
have been developed to reproduce successfully the unique dynamics of electricity prices. 
These models however are limited by their strong dependency on past observations. The 
stochastic approach is extremely sensitive to realizations of black-swan events9. Focusing 
only on price dynamics could have never predicted or explain the causes for an improbable 
event such as the electricity market crisis in California in 2000/2001.  
The ability of stochastic approaches to capture ex-post statistical properties depends heavily 
on the structure of industry, design and market operation from which price realizations are 
drawn. Significant developments or changes in electricity markets cannot be examined 
properly by stochastic models. In fact, the focus of my research question - the increasing 
penetration rate of a new intermittent energy resource – is a good illustration of such a 
dramatic change. 
The fundamental approach is the one that is suitable for our needs. The introduction of wind 
power not only affects the cost structure and aggregate power supply but also changes the 
financial risk involved in electricity market operations. For that reason, a model which 
emphasizes firm behavior needs to be developed. As more producers adopt the technology 
                                                          
9
 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the author of the book The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007), 
summarizes a black-swan event as “First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, 
because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. 
Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the 
fact, making it explainable and predictable.”, The NewYork Times, April 22, 2007.  
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(i.e. market penetration rate increases), the need for economic analysis to understand market 
dynamics is strengthened. However, our short review shows that models of electricity 
markets that are based on classic economic theory are very diverse in their behavioral 
assumptions, market structure and technical specificity of the power system.  
The current state of knowledge of the economic framework of electricity markets is 
insufficient for our purposes for several reasons. First, all studies regarding risk management 
reviewed here share the same simplifying assumption that electricity market participants are 
risk averse. This simplification of the role of risk is to say basically that firms dislike risk 
simply because they dislike variability in income. Objective functions with a risk aversion 
component collapse in most studies into a mean-variance formation (to favor higher return 
and lower variability). By making this assumption, researches presume that objective 
functions of electricity market participants should treat load prediction error in a symmetric 
manner. However, the financial and economic consequences of over-prediction and under-
prediction of load in the case of electricity trading are not symmetric. Thus the effect of risk 
in a market that faces a perfectly inelastic demand in real-time needs to be more carefully 
modeled.  
Electricity is a commodity that cannot be stored economically. For that reason holding a 
quantity that will not be consumed results in an immediate loss equal to the expenditure 
associated with the excess units bought in advance. In liberalized markets, this loss is not 
inevitable because excess volume may be resold at the day-ahead, spot markets or settled by 
a financial instrument. However, since load forecasts are published and known to all, it is not 
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uncommon that many LSEs within a region make the same error. For this reason, reselling 
electricity under these circumstances is not a desirable outcome for its holder.  
The under-purchase of electricity on the other hand exposes LSEs to spot market price 
volatility. The extreme volatility of wholesale electricity prices proved to be devastating for 
LSEs in extreme cases such as the California crisis mentioned above. Even if the probability 
of a catastrophe is low, its outcome can be very costly. In line with the above, we suggest an 
alternative approach for modeling firms’ objective functions in chapter two. Our approach let 
agents analyze the possible consequences of price volatility in the case of under or over-
purchase as opposed to taking risk as a loss factor per se. 
Secondly, most power generators are not able to supply electricity instantaneously. Due to 
ramp-up time the electricity supply curve is not stationary. In fact it corresponds to the 
generation capacity, which is applicable if needed, to supply electricity for a particular 
delivery period in the future. This is important for wind power integration because ramp-up 
time determines the feasibility and the cost of generating power in case of a sudden drop in 
wind power supply. 
Lastly, studies of wind power integration have concentrated mostly on the physical aspects of 
integration. While electricity demand provided the main uncertainty in electricity markets, 
the integration of wind power introduces uncertainty from the supply side. Electricity 
markets are usually organized as a two-settlement process with one market for short-term 
forward contracts (e.g. day-ahead or hour-ahead) and a spot market. At the time of trading 
forwards, firms have expectations about real-time load and price, which will be resolved at 
the spot market. Because wind power forecasting has particular statistical properties, 
29 
 
 
 
forecasting spot market outcome in a region with significant amounts of wind power capacity 
requires particular consideration. For this purpose one should model the statistics of regional 
wind power and the dynamics of wind power forecasting. In this study I develop a novel 
numerical methodology for simulating the probability distribution functions (pdf) of regional 
wind power and wind power forecasting associated with a prospective expansion of wind 
power capacity. Constructing these pdfs is essential for understanding the uncertainties and 
risk involved in wind-integrated electricity markets. 
Market uncertainties impact the decision making in deregulated electricity markets and 
thereby equilibrium quantities and prices. To my knowledge, no economic framework has yet 
been proposed to analyze the adjustments in the behavior of electricity market participants in 
response to the introduction of an intermittent energy resource. In this dissertation I introduce 
a theoretical framework and a numerical methodology that enable the analyses of electricity 
markets in general, and these which face a new economic environment created by an 
increasing share of wind energy. 
 
Organization of this dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provided details about the research 
question, the fundamentals of deregulated electricity markets and a literature review. In 
chapter 2 a new theoretical framework for modeling the two-settlement process in electricity 
markets is introduced. Then, numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses demonstrate the 
qualities of the proposed model. Principles of wind power are explained in chapter 3. In this 
chapter we make use of wind speed data in Iowa to exemplify and study statistical and other 
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features of wind power generation. Chapter 4 provides an extension of the theoretical 
framework developed in chapter 2 to account for deregulated electricity markets with wind 
power. In doing so, we also expand the theoretical foundations to compare electricity market 
outcomes and welfare distributions with regard to the ownership of wind power capacity. A 
novel numerical methodology for the simulations of the conditional pdf of wind power is 
developed in Chapter 5. The goal in this chapter is to mimic the dynamics of information 
regarding the availability of future wind power at the time of trading short-term electricity 
forwards. In chapter 6 we couple the theoretical framework and the numerical methodology 
to generate predictions regarding the possible market outcomes implied by selected scenarios 
of wind power expansion. Chapter 7 concludes the findings of this study and makes some 
suggestions regarding future research. 
  
31 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: An electricity market model 
 
Characteristics of a desired model 
Studying our research question requires an economic-based modeling approach. The 
following are the qualities that such a model should demonstrate:  
• Capture the main economic drivers in electricity markets, including the evolution of 
load, characteristics of supply and risks associated with electricity market operation 
• Describe the behavior of market participants in a realistic manner 
• May be calibrated easily to fit the characteristics of load in different periods  
• Flexible to accommodate various scenarios of integrating wind power with no added 
complexity 
• Generate equilibrium measures of prices and quantities that follow statistical properties 
of real-world realizations 
To our knowledge such a model does not exist. 
 
A model developed for this work 
We propose an oligopolistic equilibrium model of a deregulated electricity market. The 
theoretical framework is developed to model the dynamics of electricity trading patterns 
toward a specific delivery period in the future. We adopt the current market design of a two-
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settlement process, where short-term electricity forwards are being traded and scheduled for 
delivery at the day-ahead market, and then power is balanced in the delivery period. 
Electricity is not storable thus the delivery period is also the period that power is generated, 
transmitted and consumed. For that reason, we denote the delivery period as real-time. The 
day-ahead market will be referred to as market for forward contracts. 
The model consists on an Independent System Operator (ISO), Load Service Entities (LSEs) 
and Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The ISO manages the power system and 
administrates wholesale electricity markets. In addition, the ISO makes predictions regarding 
electricity demand and available wind power (if applicable) at the beginning of the trading 
period. These predictions are accessible to all market participants. LSE firms are the natural 
buyers of power in the model. They are committed to deliver any realized load to their end-
users for a fixed short run retail price. Since LSEs face inelastic demand in real-time, they 
have an incentive to trade power via forward contracts and by that reduce their exposure to 
upward spikes in the spot price. IPP firms generate and supply power in real-time; they are 
strictly sellers in forwards markets but may buy back contracts in the event of excess supply 
in the spot market. IPPs have a time-sensitive convex cost function which characterizes the 
various types of power generators and a range of fuel inputs in use. The model is based on a 
double-sided auction where both LSEs and IPPs engage in a Cournot competition. We 
assume that all players have perfect information about the distribution of the spot price and 
do not impose any risk preferences on their behavior (i.e. risk neutrality). 
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The model does not attempt to examine electricity commodities other than spot power. The 
outcomes of wind power integration on subsequent markets (e.g. ancillary services, reserve 
capacity and others) may be added to the model in the future. 
 
Load forecasting 
Electricity demand varies by season, holiday, day of the week, hour of the day and other 
factors. Our model addresses one particular future delivery period at a time but may be 
parameterized easily to accommodate any load characteristics of any particular period. Since 
both load and wind speed data are usually reported on an hourly basis, we construct the 
model such that a period in the model corresponds to one hour. We focus on the statistics of 
the day-ahead forecasts for the rest of this study since this is the time that electricity forwards 
are being traded in nearly all deregulated electricity markets. Although not treated in this 
study, we provide in this section a more generalized framework to explain how to go about 
examining alternative timings for trading forwards. This may be useful for considerations of 
market design. 
First we construct a synthetic time series of loads, which will be used to simulate the short-
term evolution of electricity demand. Focusing on a specific period at a time, load is 
commonly considered to be normally distributed (Bessembinder and Lemmon 2002; Loutan 
and Hawkins 2007; Oum, Oren and Deng 2006). The dynamics of electricity demand may be 
fitted by several Gaussian time series models; we employ here a fairly simple model that 
accounts for the fundamental characteristics of load dynamics. 
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Let electricity demand at time  follow an exogenous stochastic process of gZ	 type: 
 h    ij'  i '  k  il'l (2.1) 
where  is the expected value of load when taking into consideration the characteristics of 
the period in question. The error terms follow the standard distribution  
 ' 8	0, m)~n  . (2.2) 
Assume also that ij  1 and the i satisfy stationarity conditions.  
Knowing the distribution of load and prior realizations, one could infer easily the distribution 
of the prediction at each period according to how far apart that period is from real-time. That 
is, the distribution of the prediction of load in period 9, based on information at time  is 
given by  
 ho|Ω~ 8e, eij)  i )  k  il)fm)f .r 9 L 8e  io'o  k  il'l , 	ij)  k  io ) m)f .r 9 s  (2.3) 
where Ω is the information observed up to time . Notice that a prediction precision is non-
decreasing with the number of innovations 	 and non-increasing with the prediction 
horizon 	9. For example, a long horizon prediction has an expected value  and a variance 
that is composed from the number of innovations which have not occurred. Such a prediction 
would be vague compared to predictions of shorter horizons. The expected value of a one 
period ahead prediction is composed of innovations which are already known. The variance 
of this predictive is of size m) only. 
This simple representation of load provides the short-term dynamics and the statistics of load 
prediction. The choice of a gZ	 model is convenient for applications in numerical 
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simulations (illustrations are provided later in this chapter). For empirical purposes, load data 
in time series format conform better to a Zt	u model (the lags of load are observed while 
the innovations of gZ process are not). Provided that standard assumptions are met, the 
lagged coefficients of load can be estimated and used for calibration in future work. 
 
Power generation 
Typically, an electric industry is characterized by various types of power generators and a 
range of fuel inputs. For example, nuclear and coal plants are large, are costly to build, and 
generate power at the lowest heat rate levels10. Smaller generators which run usually on 
natural gas and oil have lower fixed costs. They are characterized by higher marginal costs 
because they run at lower efficiency levels and utilize energy sources which are historically 
more costly than these used by larger plants. The portfolio of generators owned by an IPP 
firm may be ordered in terms of their marginal cost to obtain a cost curve, which is 
increasing and convex. Another fundamental feature of this curve is that it is non-stationary. 
It is time-sensitive since turning on generators is constrained by ramp-up time and the 
associated start up and shut down costs. Next, we give some more details about power 
generation technology to demonstrate the importance of this feature in electricity market 
modeling.  
Power plants are classified by their purpose to serve base, intermediate or peak load periods. 
This classification refers to the flexibility of a generator to adjust to sudden changes of load 
                                                          
10
 Heat rate is used to measure how efficiently a generator converts BTUs of heat to kWh of electricity. 
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and the associated tradeoffs in the efficiency of power production. Base load plants are in use 
continuously except for maintenance shut down periods. These large plants use mainly steam 
turbine technologies powered by coal or nuclear fission. Generators that serve base load 
require a long ramp-up time and may need many hours or days before they can provide a 
stable flow of electricity and achieve their full efficiency potential. Thus they are seldom 
responsive to errors of load predictions. Peak load plants are the most flexible generator units 
because they are the least costly to turn on. In general, smaller units have a shorter ramp-up 
time and higher marginal cost. Gas turbines are regularly used to adjust for periods of peak 
load fluctuations. Their response time is normally between one and four hours according to 
size and type. For periods of intermediate load, combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants 
are usually turned on. A CCGT technology combines steam turbine with a gas turbine to 
enhance the efficiency of power generation. Using a heat recovery steam generator, the waste 
heat from gas combustion is utilized in a steam cycle. While gas turbines efficiency level is 
in the range of 10% to 30%, a modern CCGT unit may reach efficiency level of about 60%. 
However, since their ramp-up time is longer, CCGT units are typically used during periods of 
intermediate load. To generate power immediately, internal combustion engines may be used. 
These are small generators which usually produce electricity from oil almost instantaneously. 
Since they generate power in very low efficiency levels, they are used mainly for peak load 
periods and for ancillary power. 
In line with the above, we consider a time-sensitive supply curve. The curve accounts only 
for the generation capacity which if needed, is applicable to supply power in a particular 
delivery period in the future. The set of applicable generators characterizes the IPP’s supply 
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curve at each period prior to real-time. Clearly, this cost formation has some significant 
financial applications. For example, if producers turn on some of their generators just if they 
are able to sell their output in advance (e.g. forward contracts) power would be less costly to 
generate because the capacity which has relatively longer ramp-up time is characterized by 
lower heat rate. More specifically, the day-ahead supply curve (corresponding to a day-ahead 
forward market) includes more generators that are able to respond to changes in load at lower 
cost than the applicable generators in real-time. Therefore load prediction error a day before 
the delivery period has different financial consequences than the same error made just a few 
hours before the delivery. 
We assume that IPPs have an identical set of generating technologies and that capacity of 
peaking power plants is large enough to accommodate any possible load realization. 
Essentially, this is equivalent to the supposition that the system operator manages capacity 
and ancillary services adequately. 
Start by denoting c as the amount of electricity that is pre-scheduled by a particular IPP for 
delivery in real-time. Then, the costs of power generation are governed by two possible states 
of the world. If production (denoted by ) is lower than c then there is no need to turn on 
additional generators in real-time. In this event power is being generated efficiently and at a 
relatively low cost. In contrast, if realized production is higher than c, generators have to be 
turned on. In this state of the world, costs of generating power are higher for two main 
reasons. First, most idle generators cannot produce power instantly. Those that can are 
characterized by very high operating heat rate. Second, startup costs during ramp-up time 
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drive marginal costs up. Those startup costs account for the time which generators are turned 
on but their output level is still low. 
We assume the following function to model IPP’s marginal cost of power production11  
:′	, c  v  .r c w  L 0  x	  c .r y L  w c z (2.4) 
where , x w 0 are parameters and y is the upper bound for the output of generation 
capacity owned by each IPP firm. 
The parameter  characterizes the marginal cost of generating power, which is related only 
to the quantity produced. In the state of the world where the marginal unit is produced by a 
generator which was scheduled to deliver power in advance, that is the overall marginal cost. 
If IPP’s production level happens to be higher than the prescheduled capacity, an incremental 
cost x is involved in turning on additional generators toward the delivery period. In this 
event the marginal cost is higher and thus constructs a spot power supply curve which is 
steeper. The  subscript is used to differentiate between the time of pre-scheduling power and 
the delivery period (spot), denoted by subscript . 
The assumed linear marginal costs are a direct derivative of quadratic cost function. The total 
variable costs of power production are expressed as 
:	, c  v 0.5) .r c w  L 0     0.5)  0.5x	  c) .r y L  w c    .z  (2.5)  
                                                          
11
 Linear marginal cost functions are being used commonly for modeling the costs of generating power. For 
example, the supply function equilibrium model (SFE) introduced by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) has been 
applied in numerous studies of electricity markets. Other examples can be found in Bjorgan, Liu and Lawarree 
(1999), Sun and Tesfatsion (2007) and Tseng and Barz (2002). 
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Incorporating a two-state of the world cost function has a significant advantage because it 
allows for the modeling of spikes in production costs which are not entirely explained by 
high realizations of load. Sudden increase in generation costs can also be caused by 
scheduling insufficient generating capacity in advance. This may be the outcome of profit-
maximizing behavior or errors in load predictions. In both cases, in real-time the economy 
cannot avoid startup costs which may drive marginal generating cost up rapidly. 
 
Spot power and firm entry 
Markets for spot power (day-ahead, real time and others) are generally administrated by 
uniform price auctions. IPP and LSE firms submit their bids to the market administrator  
(usually the ISO itself) and generators are dispatched by their lowest bids until system 
demand is met. The bid of the marginal unit clears the market and determines the market 
price. This method is commonly adopted on the ground of the efficiencies associated with the 
competitive behavior of market participants. If sellers and buyers bid their marginal costs and 
maximum willingness to pay respectively, economic theory tells us that the allocation of 
resources will be efficient. In electricity markets however, empirical evidence (see chapter 1) 
suggest that the assumption of competitive behavior is not always suitable since each LSE 
firm represents large numbers of consumers and the number of IPP firms in a region is small. 
If IPPs exercise market power, the degree to which they are able to manipulate market prices 
depends on the timing of market operation. Although the same homogeneous commodity is 
traded in both forwards and spot markets, the cost structure is very different. Due to ramp-up 
time and fuel costs, peaking plants are turned on mainly for balancing power in real-time, 
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where base and intermediate load plants are the core supply of power in forward contracting. 
Moreover, peaking plants are relatively small and do not require high construction costs. 
Hence supernormal profits in spot market may encourage the entry of new peaking 
generators (e.g. Newbery 1998). Base and intermediate load plants on the other hand are 
more expensive and require more time to build. Therefore construction of these plants may 
be considered only in the long run. Consequently, unlike peaking plants, the strategy for 
trading the energy output of these plants is less threatened by entry. This environment gives 
rise to the claim that the degree of competitiveness of electricity markets governed by 
uniform auctions is negatively linked to the time of trade. In other words, markets which 
trade power closer to the time of delivery are expected to be more competitive and cannot 
sustain high mark-ups. Based on the motivation of preventing entry, IPPs behavior in spot 
and forwards market may diverge greatly. First, we will focus on the spot market; assuming 
zero construction costs of peaking plants motivates perfect competition behavior in real 
time12. On the other hand, market power may be exercised in markets for forward contracts. 
We will present a static model of oligopoly and analyze separately LSEs’ and IPPs’ forwards 
positions to characterize a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
 
Spot market 
If the threat of entry motivates IPPs’ to bid competitively in the spot market then we know 
that the realized spot price reflects true marginal costs. That is 
                                                          
12
 The zero construction cost assumption is made for convenient presentation of the concept. In the case of 
positive construction costs of small generators, IPPs may price their output up to their average costs to prevent 
entry. 
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x  :′	 , c   k  :′	|, c| (2.6) 
where 
x is the spot price and g is the number of IPPs in the electric industry. 
Given the number of forward contracts offered by each firm and the fact that power must be 
balanced in all times (i.e. ∑ 4|  h) one can solve for the spot market outcome. For 
example, for g  2 and assume without loss of generality that c) L c  the spot price is 

x	h, c , c) 
}~
~ J) h .r 2c w h w 0 	JIJJl)JIJ .r JelIlfI)JlJIJ w h L 2c J) h  J) 	h  c  c) .r h L JelIlfI)JlJIJ
z
  
(2.7) 
and firms’ production levels are 
a , )b 
}~
~ ) , ) .r 2c w h w 0JlIJ)JIJ , 	JIJJl)JIJ  .r JelIlfI)JlJIJ w h L 2c )  Jellf)	JIJ , )  Jellf)	JIJ  .r h L JelIlfI)JlJIJ   .
z
  
(2.8) 
 
The first parts in (2.7) and (2.8) describe the case that capacity traded via forwards is 
sufficient to meet realized demand. The second is where only firm 1 adds capacity in real-
time and the third part is where both firms startup generators in real-time. 
Next, and for the rest of this study, we focus on the existence and the characteristics of a 
symmetric forward position case. That is the case of g identical IPP firms where the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is c  k  c|. Focusing on the symmetric case simplifies the 
analysis since we need to examine only two states of the world. One is where no generators 
42 
 
 
 
are being turned on in real-time and the other is where all firms turn on generators in real-
time. For these two states it can be verified that the spot price is 

x	h, c4   J| h .r ∑ c4| w h w 0J| h  J| 	h  ∑ c4|  .r h L ∑ c4| z  (2.9) 
where c4  ac , … , c|b, and production level of firm . is 
	h, c4   | .r ∑ c4| w h w 0|  J|	JIJ 	g  1c  ∑ c4| ,4  .r h L ∑ c4|       . z  (2.10) 
 
Assuming symmetric forward positions, we can examine the changes in production levels 
and price caused by deviation of one producer. In the event that power traded via forwards is 
larger than realized load, deviation in the forward position has no significance on the spot 
market. That is because no additional generators are needed in real-time. On the other hand, 
in the event that all firms generate additional power in real-time a deviation has an impact on 
generation cost and thereby market outcome. Suppose firm . chooses to deviate, the change 
in the level of output with respect to own forward position is13 
	h, c4c  g  1g  x  x (2.11) 
and with respect to ’s position it is 
                                                          
13
 Employing a Cournot approach implies that l	·l  0 ,   1, … , g,   .. 
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	h, c4c4   1g  x  x ,   1, … , g,   .. (2.12) 
Notice that since demand must be met at all times we get ∑ nle,lfnl|4   0 .  
Finally, a Cournot firm that chooses to deviate from the symmetric position expects (in the 
case of turning on generators in real-time) a spot price change of 

x	h, c4c   xg  . (2.13) 
These derivatives become useful when we analyze the IPPs maximization problem. 
The Cournot players (both IPPs and LSEs) observe both load predictions and forwards offers 
made by other firms14. Therefore we may treat the distribution of load and thereby the 
conditional distribution of spot price and expected production levels as common knowledge 
in our model.  
 
Load Serving Entities and electricity demand 
The objective of this section is to construct the aggregate demand curve for electricity 
forwards. Assume 8 identical LSE Cournot firms where each is committed to deliver 1/8 
                                                          
14
 Conceivably, participating and observing the outcome of 24 day-ahead and 24 real-time electricity markets 
being cleared on a daily basis may be considered as having complete information about the distribution of spot 
price. In addition, electricity markets, unlike any other commodity markets, are unique due to the presence of an 
ISO. As system operator and in most times the market administer, the ISO reports the conditions of the power 
system continuously and make predictions accessible to all. The ISOs’ reports also include supply and demand 
bids; volume of forwards traded and market prices. Doing so, the ISOs act as coordinators and diminish the 
value of private information. In addition to these transparencies, electric industries are typically more 
concentrated than other industries thereby making strategic modeling approach most relevant. 
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portion of the realized amount of electricity demand. In the short run (a year or more in the 
context of building a new large generator) LSEs are compensated by a fixed electricity retail 
price 
` . In every period the ISO announces a load prediction which is superior to any 
private forecast. Since this forecast is adopted by all market participants, information about 
prediction is symmetric. When overall load prediction is h, each LSE’s expected demand 
is h 8⁄ . Armed with this information and taking its rivals’ bids as given, LSE Q maximizes 
profits by choosing a forward position c" . That is 
  max  U ¡V]^_" ¢h,  £c6
¤
6 ,6" ¥ 
 T
`  
cYc"  
¦ §
`  
x ¡h,  £c6 ¤6 ,6" c" ¥¨  ©
h8  c" ª
«
j
reh¬hfh 
(2.14)  
where £c6  is the quantity bid of player , 
c is the market price of a forward contract and  
reh¬hf is the conditional probability distribution function of load at the time of trading 
forwards. 
LSE’s expected profit has two payoff components; the first component in equation (2.14) 
stands for the payoff in trading forward contracts while the second component is the expected 
payoff associated with balancing power in the spot market. Substitute for the expected spot 
price in the symmetric case (2.9), the profits may be written as  
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  T
`  
cYc"  
 ¦ ­
`  g h®  ©h8  c" ª
∑ £¯I°,¯±   
j
reh¬hfh 
 ¦ §
`  g h  xg ¡h   £c6 
¤
6 ,6" c" ¥¨
∞
∑ £¯I°,¯±   
 ©h8  c" ª reh¬hfh . 
(2.15)  
The two integrals in equation (2.15) account for the two cases of need to balance power in 
real-time. The first integral is the expected spot payoff when the LSE has over-purchased 
power via forward contracts while the second stands for under-purchase of power. In the 
former, Contract for Differences (CFD) is put into effect. A typical CFD states that any 
deviation between forward power and spot power may be traded for the realized spot price. 
Essentially, CFD is a financial settlement that helps LSEs to hedge against volumetric risk on 
one hand and on the other helps IPPs avoid the cost and transmission problems associated 
with spot power surplus. The importance of a CFD settlement is discussed in detail in 
appendix 1. 
Taking the derivative of  with respect to the decision variable and employing the Leibniz 
integral rule, we get 
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 c"  T
`  
cY  ¦ ­
` 
g h®
∑ £¯I°,¯±   
j
reh¬hfh
 ¦ §
`  g h  xg ¡h   £c6 
¤
6 ,6" c" ¥
∞
∑ £¯I°,¯±   
 xg ©h8  c" ª¨ reh¬hfh  . 
(2.16)  
The first order condition (FOC) for interior profit maximization is 

c  ¦ g h
∑ £¯I°,¯±   
j
reh¬hfh  
¦ §g h  xg ¡h   £c6 
¤
6 ,6" c" ¥
∞
∑ £¯I°,¯±   
 xg ©h8  c" ª¨ reh¬hfh 
(2.17)  
or 

c  UT
^ 	·Y  xg ¦ ©h8  c" ª∞∑ £¯ I°,¯±    reh¬hfh . (2.18)  
Notice that the second order condition (SOC) is clearly satisfied here as 
) c" )  
2xg ¦ reh¬hf∞∑ £¯I°,¯±    h M 0 . (2.19)  
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Condition (2.18) describes the firm’s inverse demand function for forward contracts. It is 
interesting to see that an LSE’s willingness to pay for a forward contract exceeds the 
expected spot power price. Assuming risk neutrality generally drives the price of forward 
contracts to the commodity’s expected spot price (storage is irreverent for electricity). 
However, this result need not hold for the case of electricity. Since electricity has to be 
consumed at the time of production there is an economic value for pre-scheduling power for 
production (e.g. forward contracting). While for most commodities the time of production 
does not impact production cost, it does affect electricity generation cost. For that reason, 
according to condition (2.18) the LSE maximizes profits by choosing a forward position such 
that the marginal contract bought for price 
c is higher than the expected spot price. The 
wedge can be explained simply by the financial consequences of not contracting the marginal 
unit. In this case the marginal unit is not scheduled in advance, therefore it’s price also 
includes the expected cost of starting up additional generators. The expected additional cost 
of not scheduling the marginal unit is expressed by the RHS term in equation (2.18). 
Since LSEs are identical all arrive to the same FOC. Considering the symmetric Cournot-
Nash equilibrium where c  c)  k  c¤  c, the aggregate demand is 

c  UT
^ 	·Y  xg8 ¦ 	h  hc∞ reh¬hfh (2.20)  
where hc  8c. 
Corner solutions may arise where at optimum (1) c  0; the price of a forward contract is 
too high to enhance LSE’s expected profits or (2) c ² ∞; which is the case of a fully 
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hedged position. i.e. the forward price is lower than the expected spot price for any amount 
of forward bought. 
 
Independent Power Producers and electricity supply 
We start analyzing IPPs’ behavior in a fully deregulated wholesale electricity market. That is 
to assume that IPPs’ actions are not constrained by the ISO and therefore are motivated 
solely by profit maximization. Next, acknowledging IPPs’ potential market power we will 
incorporate a lower bound on IPPs’ output. This will be a more realistic examination since in 
principle IPPs can withhold a significant amount of capacity to raise prices and profits. 
The optimization problem of each IPP is similar to that of a monopoly which faces an inverse 
demand function (equation 2.20) and takes its rivals output as given. Formally, IPP . chooses 
forward position c  to maximize its expected profits 
´  maxl U µV\?? ¶h,  ·c4
|
4 ,4 ¸ 
 
c µh, c   ·c4|4 ,4 ¸  c  
 ¦ ¹
x µh, c   ·c4|4 ,4 ¸  e  c f  :e, c fº
∞
j
reh¬hfh . 
(2.21) 
where ·c4 is the quantity offered by rival  taken by . as given. 
Express ´ with respect to the two states of the world 
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´  
c µh, c   ·c4|4 ,4 ¸ c  
 ¦ »
x	h  :ef¼
∑ l·½¾,± Il
j
reh¬hfh 
 ¦ ¹
x µh, c   ·c4|4 ,4 ¸  e  c f
∞
∑ l·½¾,± Il
 :e , c fº reh¬hfh . 
(2.22)  
Taking the first derivative 
 ´c  
c	·c c  
c	·  ¦ 
x	·
∑ l·½¾,± Il
j
reh¬hfh 
 ¦ ¿
x	·c  e  c f  
x	·  À
c  1Á
∞
∑ l·½¾,± Il
 :′e, c fÂ reh¬hfh . 
(2.23)  
Writing explicitly the derivatives of the spot price and the cost function 
50 
 
 
 
 ´c  
c	·c c  
c	·  ¦ 
x	·
∑ l·½¾,± Il
j
reh¬hfh 
 ¦ ¿ xg  e  c f  
x	·  Àc  1Á
∞
∑ l·½¾,± Il
  c  xe  c f À
c  1ÁÂ reh¬hfh . 
(2.24)  
Employing symmetry and collecting terms  
 ´c  
c	·c c  
c	·  UT
x	·Y
 x ©1  1gª ¦ e  c f
∞
∑ l·½¾,± Il
reh¬hfh . (2.25)  
The FOC is 

c	·  UT
x	·Y  
c	·c c  
x ©1  1gª ¦ e  c f
∞
∑ l·½¾,± Il
reh¬hfh . (2.26)  
The first derivative of the forward price with respect to quantity is  

c	·c   xg ©1  18ª ¦ reh¬hfh
∞
∑ l·½¾,± Il  . (2.27)  
Solving for the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium where c  c)  k  c|  c gives 
the following optimality condition 
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ceh, gcf  UT
x	·Y  xg ©1  18ª c ¦ reh¬hfh∞|l  
x ©1  1gª ¦ 	  c
∞
|l
reh¬hfh . 
(2.28)  
The willingness to sell forward contracts may be higher or lower than the expected spot 
price. Withholding capacity has two effects. On the one hand it maintains high prices in both 
spot and forwards markets. On the other hand, an IPP firm that chooses to offer more forward 
contracts sells more power in the spot market as well. 
We show in appendix 2 that the IPP’s profit function is strictly concave in c . This confirms 
that if a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists it is a unique symmetric solution for the 
IPP’s problem. 
 
Solving the model 
If there is a forward price 
cÃ at which the market clearing condition cÃ g  hcÃ  holds, then 
we say that the market for forward contracts has an interior symmetric solution. Equating 
aggregate demand with aggregate supply (equations 2.20 and 2.28) the following must hold 
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cÃ	hcÃ  UT
^ 	·Y  xg8 ¦ 	h  hcÃ∞Ã reh¬hfh 
 UT
x	·Y  xg ©1  18ª cÃ ¦ reh¬hfh∞Ã
 x ©1  1gª ¦	  cÃ 
∞
Ã
reh¬hfh 
(2.29)  
which solves for the equilibrium quantity of aggregate forward contracts  
hcÃ  ©g8  g  8g8  g  1ª  Ä h
∞Ã reh¬hfhÄ reh¬hfh∞Ã   . (2.30)  
Substituting this result back into (2.20) the equilibrium forward price is 

c	hcÃ  UT
^ 	·Y  ©1  g8  g  8g8  g  1ª  xg8 ¦ h∞Ã reh¬hfh 
Å 
c	hcÃ  UT
^ 	·Y  J	¤I |¤	|¤I|I  Ä h∞Ã reh¬hfh  .  
(2.31)  
Then, the forward price can be expressed by summing the expected spot price and the 
forward premium 

c  UT
^ 	·Y  tc (2.32)  
where 
tc  x	8  1g8	g8  g  1 ¦ h
∞
Ã
reh¬hfh . 
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Preliminary results and discussion 
At this point we can make some statements about the equilibrium volume and price of 
forward contracts. The equilibrium volume of forwards depends on the number of IPPs and 
LSEs in the market and the stochastic nature and precision of load forecasting. It is easy to 
see that the equilibrium volume of forward contracts increases in the number of power 
producers. As the number of IPPs increases, it is less effective for these firms to maximize 
profits by withholding production. It is not a surprising result seeing that power producers 
engage in an oligopoly game and the demand side in the model is completely inelastic in 
real-time. Furthermore, expression (2.30) shows that the equilibrium number of forwards 
increases in g at a decreasing rate. This reflects the rate at which market power diminishes in 
the number of producers. 
In the contrast, the equilibrium number of forwards decreases in the number of LSE firms. 
The explanation for this result is quite intuitive and related to the public good aspect of 
electricity forwards. LSEs share the responsibility to deliver any realized amount of load in 
real-time. Similar to the familiar free-rider problem each LSE firm would prefer that other 
firms  purchase forward contracts which would then lower the expected spot price for all 
buyers. But with a relatively large number of firms, the ability of each firm to manipulate the 
spot price is relatively small. Accordingly, the aggregate willingness to purchase forward 
contracts decreases in the number of LSEs (illustrated and further discussed in the next 
section). 
The absence of the cost parameters   and x from the expression describing the equilibrium 
amount of forwards is a noteworthy result. It means that the level of forwards in equilibrium 
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is fixed over the range of positive cost parameters. Since LSEs demand in spot market is 
inelastic, IPPs decision on the amount of forwards is contingent on the distribution of load 
only. Accordingly, the impact of the cost parameters on welfare distribution in equilibrium is 
captured only by the forward price. 
The wedge between the price of forwards and the spot price is rooted in the dynamic nature 
of the supply curve. Since the cost of generating power is increasing in the time of trade (due 
to ramp-up time), the link between expected spot price and the forward price is not one to 
one. In particular, the forward premium is proportional to the incremental startup cost of 
generation units (x). This result expresses our assertion that the premium is driven by the 
dynamic nature of production cost. LSEs desire to avoid this cost in the spot market and the 
ability of producers to exercise market power in the forward market determines the size of 
the forward premium. Notice that the premium tc is positive in expectations and decreases 
in both the number of IPP and LSE firms. 
Still, there are two cases where the spot and forward prices may coincide and reproduce the 
familiar competitive solution under risk neutrality assumption. First, consider the case of 
omitting ramping costs from the analysis. This can be expressed by imposing x  0; zero 
incremental cost between the two periods of trade  and . Then, aggregate demand for 
forward contracts would be characterized by15  
hcÃ   0 .r 
c L UT
^ Y   T0,∞ .r 
c  UT
^ Y   
∞ .r 
c M UT
^ Y  .z (2.33)  
                                                          
15
 To arrive to this result simply maximize equation (2.15) and impose x  0.  
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In this case the Nash equilibrium is characterized by any non-negative amount of forward 
contracts as IPPs cannot enhance their expected profits by withholding capacity. 
Secondly, there would be no wedge in expectations if the number of IPP or LSE firms is 
sufficiently large. In particular, the forward price converges to the competitive price in the 
limit as g ² ∞ or 8 ² ∞. In any of these cases the forwards premium goes to zero and the 
forward equilibrium price would reflect the expected spot price.  
To conclude this part, the model is able to explain the positive forwards premiums reported 
by many empirical studies (e.g. Benth, Cartea and Kiesel 2008, Bessembinder and Lemmon 
2002, Cartea and Villaplana 2008, Douglas and Popova 2008, and Longstaff and Wang 
2004). Yet, it is important to perceive a fundamental difference between our work and the 
related body of literature in this area. The results presented by this model are not driven by a 
risk preferences assumption but by the basic properties of power generation cost structure, 
the number of sellers, buyers, and the commonly adopted design of deregulated electricity 
markets. 
 
Capacity withholding constraint 
The equilibrium volume and price of forward contracts developed in previous sections 
characterize the solution in a fully deregulated electricity market. Our results make it clear 
that IPPs have an incentive to manipulate market prices by withholding generation capacity 
in the forward market to maximize the joint profits from the spot and forward markets. While 
welfare loss is typically expected in a Cournot competition, the loss in electricity markets is 
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more severe than in other markets in which market power is present. That is because spot 
power demand is inelastic; the power is being generated eventually in spite of any capacity 
withholding behavior. Consequently, the production of power in real-time may be inefficient 
and cause misuse of energy resources.  Policy makers and administers of deregulated 
electricity markets are aware of this problem. Yet, in practice it is not an easy task to measure 
when market power is exercised. Overall operating costs and production constraints are not 
transparent. Operating costs includes the incremental cost involves in shifting to power plants 
of higher heat rates, start up and shut down costs and others16. Those as well as a physical 
withholding due to outages and periods of maintenance are essentially private information 
and therefore precise mark-ups are complicated to estimate.  
Although there is an ongoing debate about what is the effective way to measure and monitor 
the degree of competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets, some provisions are 
commonly implemented. For example, the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) is used as a 
first screening tool for market power by governmental agencies. Price caps are used 
frequently as an upper bound for spot price. The price cap is useful in stabilizing the 
volatility of spot markets and limiting LSEs’ exposure to spot prices. Finally, and maybe the 
most effective and frequently used tool to deal with uncompetitive behavior is to impose a 
must-offer provision. Doing so, ISOs limit the ability of large producers to exercise market 
power by forcing them to participate and offer their capacity in forward and spot markets. In 
addition, the ISOs examine regularly whether the prices offered by IPPs enable them to 
schedule considerable volume in advance, bilaterally and via forward markets. 
                                                          
16
 Mansur (2008) shows that by ignoring production constraints such as ramping costs, several studies 
overestimated the exercise of market power in electricity markets. 
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In some markets the expected load is used to determine producers’ responsibilities for 
forward contracting. In the California ISO for example, if the amount of power cleared by the 
forward markets is insufficient, a secondary auction takes place. The Residual Unit 
Commitment (RUC) is an auction designed to force IPPs to supply the expected missing 
amount based on their incremental cost. In the case that IPPs are able to demonstrate market 
power while trading forwards, the RUC as a more regulated mechanism, is not a favorable 
alternative for them. 
Back to our model, a binding constraint on the offered capacity in forwards markets forces 
IPPs to move away from their optimal forwards positions. Since IPPs are identical it is 
reasonable to look at the case where the ISO imposes a symmetric constraint on the 
minimum amount of power that each IPP is held responsible to offer. In this case, IPPs do 
not have any incentive to offer more than their own constraint because that will increase their 
distance from the unconstrained (optimal) solution thus decreasing their profits further. 
Therefore, the aggregate volume of forwards imposed by the firm-level constraints can be 
mapped to a particular point on the demand curve.  
Frequently, ISOs sets a volumetric constraint which is a function of the moments of the 
forecasted load. A straightforward example is the one mentioned above, where IPPs are 
required to offer at least the expected load. In this case the forward price mapped from the 
demand curve is simply 

c  UT
^ 	·Y  xg8 ¦ 	h  hc« reh¬hfh (2.34)  
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which can be simplified further assuming a particular conditional probability distribution 
function. 
 
Computational experiments 
We conducted many simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of the model in capturing the 
economic determinants in electricity markets. We present and discuss in this section the 
model predictions and the sensitivity of the results to the parameters employed in the 
analysis. We consider the following figures for the base-case scenario in the numerical 
analysis. Assume that there are 5 IPP and 5 LSE firms, the cost parameters of generating 
power are   1, x  2 and load is distributed normally and expected to be 100 at real-
time. Also, the standard deviation of load prediction is 5 (mean absolute error of 4% of the 
expected value) when forecasting demand at the day-ahead.17 All the numerical results 
consist of 5,000 draws. 
 
Spot price distribution 
The model focuses on one particular delivery period at a time. Since there is a great 
variability in the seasonal, diurnal, hourly and other temporal characteristic of electricity 
demand we start by evaluating the flexibility of the model to accommodate analyses of 
different delivery periods. 
                                                          
17
 Various sources indicate a MAE of overall load prediction in the range of 3%-5%, depends on the season and 
the size of the region. 
  
 
We consider periods that are characterized by expected loads in the range of 50 to 150. The 
variance is computed as
the expected load of the period in question.
Figure 2 displays the densities of spot market prices by expected electricity demand. 
particular, the middle density is the one 
are skewed as implied by the 
expected load the spot price density is shifted right and its variation is higher. In reality, even 
hourly prices in a single day are drawn from very different distributions. Demand (and 
thereby prices) at 2am would fit a density in the left sid
same day would be characterized by a density on the right side of the same figure as this is 
usually the peak load hour of the day.
Figure 2: Spot market price densities by expected 
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Load uncertainty  
We let standard deviation of load to vary between 5 and 35 to explore the impact of load 
uncertainty on market equilibrium. Given spot price expectations, the demand for electricity 
forwards is illustrated in figure 3. As we increase the uncertainty regarding real-time load, 
demand for forwards shifts upward and becomes smoother. This reflects the higher 
probability of making errors in load forecasting and therefore increases LSEs willingness to 
pay for forward contracts. 
 
 
Figure 3: Aggregate demand for electricity forwards as a function of standard deviation of load 
 
Given demand for forwards, each IPP chooses how much electricity to offer in forward 
markets which then determines the aggregate supply curve in the spot market. Equilibrium in 
the forwards market is described in figure 4 for various levels of standard deviation of load. 
The intersections of the dashed vertical line and the demand curve for forwards in the graphs 
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in figure 4 describe the equilibrium price and quantity of forward contracts in each. Once the 
forward market is cleared, production cost of any possible realization of load and thereby 
spot price is determined. The equilibrium is characterized by a capacity withholding as one 
would expect in an oligopoly modeling. The kink on the supply curve at the equilibrium 
quantity of forwards describes the shift into a less efficient power production scheme in the 
event that real-time load is higher than the prescheduled amount. Then, the equilibrium at the 
spot market may be depicted as the intersection of the illustrated supply curve and an 
inelastic demand curve created by any given realization of load.  
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4a. 
 
4b. 
  
4c. 4d. 
Figure 4: Equilibrium in the forwards market and the consequence real-time supply curve. Results by 
standard deviation of load of sizes 5, 15, 25 and 35 are depicted in figures 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d 
respectively 
 
The numerical experiments show that the equilibrium amount of forwards increases in load 
uncertainty. Demand for forwards increases in standard deviation but demand is also more 
elastic. Consequently, IPPs maximize profits by offering more forward contracts. Doing so, 
forward premiums decrease in load uncertainty since more power in scheduled in advance 
(figure 5). 
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In the base-case scenario, the expected forward premium is about 5.6% and decreasing with 
load uncertainty. Similarly to real-world observations, the model generates higher (lower) 
premiums for peak (base) load periods. 
 
Figure 5: Forward premiums as a function of standard deviation of load 
 
The number of IPPs and LSEs  
In a standard Cournot competition the degree to which market power can be exercised is 
captured essentially by the number of oligopoly players. For example, in the case of a single 
producer the model outcome coincides with the solution for the monopoly’s profit 
maximization problem. In the case of a duopoly, aggregate profits will be less than the 
situation of two producers acting as monopolies, and lastly, for a sufficient number of 
producers the profits would be similar to those generated under perfect competition. On this 
aspect, the model developed here generates market power dynamics which is similar to the 
results described by a standard Cournot model. 
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In figure 6 we examine the results for the simulations of the base-case scenario varying the 
number of power producers. As the number of IPPs increases, more electricity is settled via 
forward contracts. This is due to the decrease in IPPs ability to exercise market power by 
withholding capacity. For example, the particular parameters employed here shows that 
without any regulation a single IPP would offer less than 15% of the expected load for 
forward contracting. The amount increases at a decreasing rate; one half in a duopoly electric 
industry and so on.  
The equilibrium prices and profits generated by different numbers of producers are not 
comparable since the cost function of generating power is convex. Yet, we may evaluate the 
sensitivity of forward premiums to the number of IPPs. Similar to the equilibrium amount of 
forwards, the change in premiums also reflect the change in the ability to exercise market 
power (figure 6). Interestingly, the illustration shows that the model predicts positive 
premiums even when the amount of electricity traded via forwards exceed the predicted load.  
 
Figure 6: Equilibrium electricity forwards and premiums by number of IPPs in the market (base-case 
scenario assumptions) 
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Looking at the number of LSE firms reveals a very similar trend in the forward premiums. 
Except that the premium decreases here are not due to an increase in the number of forwards. 
LSEs’ incentive to purchase forward contracts is for the purpose of decreasing the expected 
spot price. Although the decision on the procurement of forwards is taken on the firm level, it 
has a public good aspect for all LSEs; a lower expected spot price.  
When the number of LSEs is relatively small, the quantity purchased by an individual firm 
has a greater impact on the spot price hence the willingness to pay is higher. As the number 
of LSEs increases, each firm’s ability to influence the spot price is smaller and that 
encourages a free-rider behavior. As a result, when we increase the number of LSEs the 
volume of trade is almost constant but the premium reflects the diminishing interest in 
hedging spot market risk by forward contracting (figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Equilibrium electricity forwards and premium by number of LSEs in the market (base-case 
scenario assumptions) 
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Cost of generating power 
Our analytical results from previous sections show that the forward price depends linearly on 
the cost parameters  and x. This result holds whether the market is fully deregulated (eq. 
2.32) or whether capacity constraint is being imposed (eq. 2.34). When we look at the 
forward premium we see that the wedge between the spot price and the forwards price is 
fixed for any positive value of . The reason for that is the fact that  is an essential cost 
which cannot be avoided in any state of the world. That is an expected result since the 
demand for hedging power is created by the fact that generating power by starting up 
generators is more costly. On the other hand, the forward premium divided by the expected 
spot price is increasing approximately linearly in x (figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Premiums as a function of real-time cost parameter and the number of IPPs 
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Capacity withholding constraint  
The base-case scenario provides solution for a fully deregulated electricity market for a given 
set of assumptions. Keeping the same set of assumptions we compare this unconstrained 
solution with particular levels of capacity constraints the ISO may impose on IPPs to offer in 
forward markets.  
The results are presented in figure 9. The model emphasizes the effectiveness of imposing a 
capacity constraint in electricity forwards markets. In this example the unconstrained 
aggregate amount offered by 5 power producers is 80.6, which is in the order of four standard 
deviations lower than the expected load. The illustration shows that the forward price and 
IPPs profits decrease in the magnitude of the must-offer constraint. Notice that the constraint 
is much more effective in the range which it is lower than the expected load. This is due to 
the asymmetric financial consequences that all market participants experience if realized load 
is lower or higher than expected. 
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Figure 9: Equilibrium forward price and IPPs expected profits by a capacity withholding constraint 
 
 
Chapter summary 
In this chapter a new theoretical framework for modeling deregulated electricity markets has 
been developed. The model complies with the desired characteristics we list at the beginning 
of the chapter. It incorporates firms’ behaviors in electricity markets to construct transparent 
and traceable market equilibrium measures. In addition, we performed computational 
experiments to demonstrate how the model can be employed in studying applied problems. 
We presented sensitivity analysis for the impact of parameters describing generation costs, 
industry structure and uncertainties on market equilibrium. The model showed itself to be 
flexible and accommodating large arrays of assumptions regarding the characteristics of the 
delivery period of electricity.  
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Similar to real-world electricity markets, the distributions of the spot price at different 
delivery periods in the model diverge greatly. Also, the model generates a wedge between the 
forward price and the expected spot price. This result is in line with the extensive empirical 
evidence suggesting the existence of a forward premium. While the literature commonly 
refers to this wedge as a risk premium, the results presented by this model are not driven by a 
risk preferences assumption but by the electric industry structure, fundamental properties of 
electricity production and the design of deregulated electricity markets. 
Finally, we show that the deadweight welfare loss associated with a fully liberalized market 
could be substantial. Having various generation technologies, IPPs have an incentive to 
substitute away from the more efficient generating units for expensive spot power 
production. This in turn generates sizeable premiums for forward contracts and supernormal 
profits. When we add a capacity withholding constraint (also known as a must-offer 
provision), the welfare loss and premiums are reduced.  
In the rest of the study, the model developed here is extended to allow thorough examination 
of the possible paths and market outcomes for wind power integration. In particular, the 
required extension of the theoretical model is introduced in chapter 4, and the appropriate 
numerical methodology for simulating scenarios of wind power integration is developed in 
chapter 5.  
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Chapter 3: Wind power 
 
Introduction 
Our objective in this chapter is to discuss the technical, statistical and financial principles of 
wind power capacity. We start with a review of recent developments, current status and 
challenges of wind power expansion. Then, we make use of Iowa wind speed data to explain 
and illustrate the basics of wind speed statistics and the estimation of a local wind speed 
probability distribution density. Next, we give details about the relation among wind speed, 
wind power resources and usable wind power, by exemplifying the performance of a typical 
modern large wind turbine. In doing so, we explore spatial differences as well as month to 
month variability of harvesting wind power at selected sites in Iowa. In the following section, 
we outline some findings from the literature regarding wind spatial correlation. This is 
particularly relevant for this study since we are interested in modeling an intermittent 
regional wind power supply. Lastly, we discuss the implications of uncertain power supply 
with relation to electricity markets and our economic framework in particular. 
 
Overview 
Global installation of wind power capacity has been increasing rapidly during the last two 
decades. In particular, more than 30% of the world’s wind power capacity was added just in 
2008 (DOE 2009). The highest penetration rate is experienced by Denmark where wind 
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power accounts for 20% of overall electricity consumption. Next, Spain followed by 
Portugal, Ireland and Germany demonstrate penetration rates in the range of 7%-12%. In 
many other countries wind power capacity has increased recently as well, yet accounts for 
only up to 5% of overall capacity. When it comes to overall wind power capacity, the ranking 
is quite different. During 2008 the U.S. overtook Germany to take the lead in cumulative 
wind capacity with 25,369 MW vs. 23,933 MW in Germany. However, the percentage of 
wind power consumed in the U.S. accounts only for 2% of overall electricity consumption. 
Other countries with increasing wind capacity but still low penetration rates are India and 
China (about 3% and 1%, respectively). This trend suggests that there is room for large 
increases in wind capacity in many countries. 
Several linked forces may explain the growth in wind power capacity in recent years. First, 
advances in wind harvesting technologies have allowed larger turbines to be installed. The 
average wind turbine installed in the U.S. in 2008 was rated at 1.67 MW of capacity, which 
is 133% higher than average rated capacity of turbines in 1998-1999. Nowadays, engineers 
have completed the design and manufacturing of 3 MW turbines, which are the largest 
commercial turbines to come online. As we explain in the next section, economies of scale 
are important in wind power production. Therefore, the ability to transport, install and 
connect larger turbines to the grid at sites with appropriate wind speed conditions yields 
increasing returns. Scale effects, technological advances in turbine designs and better 
transmission lines have significantly lowered the cost of harvesting and delivering wind 
power over the years. 
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Government subsidies supporting renewable energy have also increased, reducing the private 
cost of wind projects further. The main justifications for these subsidies are energy 
independence and reductions in environmental externalities from the combustion of fossil 
fuels. Life cycle assessment studies show that the energy payback time of a wind turbine is 
less than six months over a 20 year life time (Martínez, et al. 2009; Schleisner 2000). 
Switching from conventional generators that run on coal and natural gas to wind turbines 
mitigates almost all greenhouse gasses emissions related to the production of electricity. 
Martínez et al. show that the cradle to grave environmental contamination of wind project 
may be recovered nearly 31 times during the life of a wind turbine.  
Concerns regarding dependency on fossil fuels brought forward the importance to diversify 
energy portfolios. Employing various renewable energy sources in a portfolio is a practical 
way to promote energy security. A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is a state policy in the 
U.S. and in some other countries that support this goal. RPSs mandate the shares of 
electricity to be produced from wind, solar, hydro, biomass and other renewable energy 
sources.  
In addition, speculations about fuels reserves and their price behaviors encourage 
investments in wind power projects. The intrinsic variation of wind speed is uncorrelated 
with fuel markets. From a risk management point of view, this fact alone may enhance an 
energy portfolio in a firm level.    
Several factors need to be considered and resolved before the installation of significant new 
wind power capacity becomes feasible. The main challenge with large projects is updating 
transmission systems. Wind capacity that exceeds local electricity demand requires 
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additional costs associated with updating the grid and constructing adequate transmission 
lines. Even so, many wind farms are constructed in rural areas. That is because of two main 
advantages those areas have over urban areas: land availability for wind projects and the 
decrease of the potential problems associated with turbines’ sound due to relatively low 
population density. Since power systems in rural areas are not structured to handle electricity 
flows from large wind farms, integrating new wind capacity to the grid involves substantial 
planning and investments. The costs of updating transmission lines to deliver energy from 
distant areas to hubs of electricity are usually governed by the regional system operators.  
The physical aspect of setting up wind turbines is another limiting factor. Costs related to 
transportation and installation of large turbines increase exponentially with size. Therefore, 
the benefit from scaling up wind projects should be weighed against the cost of the extra 
logistics involved. For example, on shore turbines used to be generally larger than offshore 
ones due to ground transportation constraints. Also, the delivery (if applicable) and 
installation requirements become more complex when dealing with larger components. To be 
able to overcome the downside of shipping and handling turbine’s parts over long distances, 
factories manufacturing these parts may be constructed in mainland areas. For instance, Iowa 
and its surrounding states are in the process of creating a conglomeration of plants for 
turbines, blades and towers.18 For that reason, it is not surprising that Iowa is ranked second 
in the U.S. with current wind capacity of 3043.28 MW and first in wind power consumption 
                                                          
18
 For example, during 2008 alone the following facilities came online: Clipper Windpower (Cedar Rapids), 
Acciona Energy North America (West Branch), Siemens Power Generation (Fort Madison) and TPI (Newton). 
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of 13.3%.19 Wind capacity expansion in that region in recent years is explained partly by the 
availability of locally manufactured parts. 
Finally, once adequate infrastructures are established and turbines had been constructed the 
transmission itself is not cost free. Long distance power transmissions and distributions incur 
line losses. The costs associated with these losses are particularly relevant for wind farms 
constructed in rural areas. 
 
Wind speed 
Wind is caused by differences in air pressure within the atmosphere. Air tends to flow from 
regions of high pressure to regions of low pressure. The difference in pressure is the outcome 
of uneven heating of the earth by solar radiation. Therefore, wind variation may be viewed 
based on annual, seasonal, diurnal, hourly and inter-hourly differences. These variations need 
to be acknowledged and evaluated properly for wind energy considerations. 
Numerous probability density functions (pdf) have been employed in applications of wind 
speed studies. Carta, Ramirez and Velazquez (2008) carry out a review based on more than 
two hundred studies describing wind speed frequency distributions. The most frequently 
employed is the two-parameter Weibull pdf which has been found to have a series of 
advantages. Among these are dependency on two parameters only, flexibility, simplicity and 
a good fit to measured data. The Weibull is generally an appropriate pdf choice for wind 
speed modeling with one exception. For regions that have frequent occurrences of no wind, 
                                                          
 18, 19, 21  American Wind Energy Association, http://www.awea.org/projects/projects.aspx?s=Iowa (accessed 
August 09). 
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other probability distributions may be more suited. The catalog presented by Carta, Ramirez 
and Velazquez (2008) review the appropriate pdfs in this circumstance as well. However, 
since the decision on location for wind farms is not random, sites with low wind speeds are 
unlikely choices for wind projects. Thus we focus on the Weibull pdf in this study. Next, we 
give some details how to go about employing the Weibull pdf to describe the statistics of 
wind speed. 
Let + (m/s) denote wind speed, B (m/s) and R the scale and the shape parameters of the 
Weibull pdf respectively, then the wind speed density function can be written as 
 r	+  Æ= Ç=Æ Fu È Ç=ÆÉ   . (3.1) 
Some families of distributions are obtainable as special cases of the Weibull distribution. For 
example, for R=1 the Weibull distribution becomes an exponential distribution. In the case 
of R=2 the distribution is reduced to the Rayleigh distribution, which if applicable simplifies 
the analysis of wind speed considerably20. For the special case of R=3.6 the Weibull 
distribution is approximately normal (Dubey 1967). It was shown that a simple data 
transformation can make the relation between the Weibull and the Gaussian distributions 
very useful for studying wind speed (Torres, et al. 2005). The transformation is based on the 
fact that a Weibull distribution raised to the power of C is also a Weibull. Let C  R/3.6 and 
raise wind speed data to the power of C, then wind speed data may be analyzed with respect 
to the normal distribution. In figure 10 we describe the distributions for the case that wind 
                                                          
20
 The knowledge of mean wind speed alone is sufficient to employ the Rayleigh distribution. Denote mean 
wind speed by , the pdf can be described as r	+  Ë)  Ç4 Fu È ËÌ  Ç4)É. 
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speed has Weibull distribution with the parameters R=2.2 and B=3. It is shown that an 
approximation to the Weibull may be obtained by employing one of the other distributions 
discussed here. The decision on which distribution to apply and the consequent goodness of 
fit is determined by the particular shape parameter of the Weibull pdf in use.  
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Figure 10: Illustration of a Weibull pdf with relation to other distributions 
 
In the following, we utilize data from Iowa to investigate and exemplify the distributional 
patterns of wind speed. Long run averages of hourly wind speed data from numerous cities in 
Iowa are available from the Iowa Energy Center. The data we employ is reported in a 
frequency distribution format where the number of hours at each wind speed is recorded.  
Parameters can be estimated with methods of moments, maximum likelihood, or least 
squares. In this study we employ a method introduced by Seguro and Lambert (2000). This is 
a modified maximum likelihood method for analyzing data in a frequency format. Denote the 
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relative frequency of a particular wind speed + by u	+ where Σu	+  1. The Weibull 
pdf parameters are estimated by the expressions 
 R  ¹∑ u	++Æ	+6 ∑ u	++Æ6   u	+	+
6
 º
 
 
(3.2) 
and 
 B  ¹ u	++Æ6 º
 /Æ  . (3.3) 
Equation (3.2) is solved by an iterative process first, and then equation (3.3) is solved 
directly. 
The relation among the Weibull parameters and the moments of the distribution are given by  
   BÎ	1  1 R⁄  (3.4) 
and 
 +  B)TÎ	1  2 R⁄   Î)	1  1 R⁄ Y  B)Î	1  2 R⁄ ) (3.5) 
where  and + stand for the mean and the variance of wind speed, respectively and Î	· is 
the gamma function.  
Wind speed is classified on a scale of 1 to 7 and is usually measured at 10 or 50 meters above 
ground (table 1). Iowa wind speed is ranked 10th in the U.S. for its wind energy potential.21 
The annual average wind speeds measured 50 meters above ground in Iowa are 5.5-6 m/s at 
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the northeastern parts of Iowa, and generally increase as one goes from the southeastern to 
the northwestern parts from 6 m/s to 8 m/s. We choose to examine counties in Iowa which 
already accommodate a large number of wind power plants (e.g. the northwestern counties) 
as well as others to demonstrate the distributional differences of wind resources over space. 
 
Table 1: Wind speed classification 
Wind 
power 
class
Resources 
potential
Wind speed 
at 10 m 
height  (m/s)
Wind power 
density at 10 m 
height (W/m²)
Wind speed 
at 50 m 
height  (m/s)
Wind power 
density at 50 m 
height (W/m²)
1 <4.4 0-100 <5.6 0-200
2 Marginal 4.4-5.1 100-150 5.6-6.4 200-300
3 Fair 5.1-5.6 150-200 6.4-7.0 300-400
4 Good 5.6-6.0 200-250 7.0-7.5 400-500
5 Excellent 6.0-6.4 250-300 7.5-8 500-600
6 Outstanding 6.4-7.0 300-400 8.0-8.8 600-800
7 Superb 7.0-9.4 400-1,000 8.8-11.9 800-2,000
Source: U.S. Department of Energy
 
The demand for electricity is strongly related to temperature. Low temperatures increase 
electricity demand due to heating appliances while high temperatures increase demand 
because of the use of air conditioners. Since heating is fueled by many energy sources and 
cooling is almost exclusively by electricity, the highest demand typically occurs during the 
summer months. In figure 11 we exemplify the demand for electricity in April and July in 
two regions in the U.S. during 2007. In both regions demand is roughly 50 percent higher 
and much more volatile in July. Higher variability in electricity demand is associated with 
frequent peak load periods which are typically characterized by higher electricity prices. 
Therefore, one would expect that in these periods wind power will be in higher demand. For 
that reason, we focus on the distribution of a typical July to demonstrate the spatial Weibull 
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densities, means and standard deviations in Iowa (table 2). We employ wind speed data 
measured at 50 meters above ground.   
 
Figure 11: Hourly load in 2007 at the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and the 
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) which includes the transmissions to Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas. 
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Table 2: Estimated July wind speed parameters and moments at selected sites in Iowa, U.S. 
County City Location
Shape 
Paramater 
k
Scale 
parameter 
c (m/s)
Mean 
(m/s)
Std 
(m/s)
Sac Schalar NW 2.61 6.90 6.13 2.53
Pocahantas Palmer NW 2.62 7.16 6.36 2.61
Hancock Garner N Central 2.60 6.88 6.11 2.53
Carroll Arcadia Central W 2.63 7.09 6.30 2.57
Hamilton Blairsburg Central 2.64 7.08 6.29 2.57
Floyd Charles City NE 2.59 6.40 5.68 2.36
Lee Argyle SE 2.54 5.95 5.28 2.23
Osceola Harris NW 2.64 7.41 6.58 2.68
BuenaVista Storm lake NW 2.59 6.98 6.20 2.57
Worth Joice N Central 2.61 6.96 6.18 2.55
Dickinson Spirit Lake NW 2.63 7.09 6.30 2.57
Greene Jefferson Central 2.58 6.45 5.73 2.38
Allamakee ChurchtownNE 2.52 5.36 4.76 2.02
 
The average wind speed is in the range of 4.76 to 6.58 (m/s), and standard deviation is 
between 2.02 and 2.68 (m/s). The variation of wind speed at different sites cannot be 
compared by the standard deviations since they are estimates of different Weibull 
distributions. Thus, for this purpose wind speed coefficient of variation (B+Ïx) should be 
computed. We use equations (3.4) and (3.5) to obtain  
 B+Ïx  √+ ⁄  TΓ	1  2 R⁄   Γ)	1  1 R⁄ Y )⁄ /TΓ)	1  1 R⁄ Y . (3.6) 
It is clear from (3.6) that B+Ïx is a function of the shape parameter only. Also, it can be 
shown that B+Ïx is a decreasing function of R. This result is useful since comparing R of 
different Weibull distributions alone can provide a standardized index for the fluctuation of 
wind speed. For example, our results show that counties Hamilton and Osceola have the 
highest estimated shape parameters (depicted in column 4) therefore, they present the lowest 
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wind speed variations as well (B+Ïx~40.7%). Since our estimates suggest that Osceola 
County also has the highest mean, it is the most preferred site in terms of both average wind 
speed and coefficient of variation. We depict the fitted distribution of wind speed at 
Allamakee (B+Ïx~42.4%) and Osceola counties to demonstrate the differences in wind 
speed distribution over space (figure 12). These two are selected since they display the 
minimum and maximum values of both Weibull parameters in our sample respectively. The 
two fitted distributions are skewed as implied by the magnitude of the shape parameters. The 
distribution of the northwestern site has higher mean and fatter tails compared to the 
northeastern site. 
Note, however that wind speed distributions by themselves are not sufficient for evaluating 
returns to wind power projects. As we discuss later, the economic wind potential of a site is 
actually linked more to the usable power rather than its wind speed. In addition, economic 
evaluation of wind potential of a site should not be weighted uniformly over all periods. 
Wind power revenues are subject to the price of electricity at the time of delivery. On periods 
of higher electricity demand, prices tend to be higher as well. Therefore, higher wind speeds 
in certain periods are more valuable than in other periods. 
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Figure 12: Fitted Weibull pdfs for July wind speed distributions at 50m height for sites at Allamakee 
and Osceola counties, IA  
 
 Next, we examine the month to month variation of wind speed. We carry on with our 
example and focus on the wind variation at Osceola County (table 3). Our estimation shows 
that the winter months are windier, peaking in March while summer months are somewhat 
calmer. The windiest month has roughly 30% higher average wind speed than the lowest. 
July in particular has the second lowest monthly average wind speed, which stands in conflict 
with the elevated electricity demand at that time of the year. The coefficient of variation of 
each month shows non-monotonous trend, peaking in November with 46% and falls below 
40% for only a few months in a typical year. 
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Table 3: Estimated monthly wind speed parameters and moments at Osceola County, IA at 50m 
Shape 
parameter 
k
Scale 
parameter 
c  (m/s)
Mean 
(m/s)
Std 
(m/s)
January 2.73 9.07 8.07 3.19
February 2.61 9.17 8.15 3.36
March 2.76 9.35 8.32 3.26
April 2.50 9.37 8.31 3.55
May 2.50 8.69 7.71 3.30
June 2.48 8.33 7.39 3.18
July 2.64 7.41 6.58 2.68
August 2.70 7.28 6.47 2.59
September 2.61 8.08 7.17 2.96
October 2.67 8.85 7.87 3.18
November 2.32 8.98 7.96 3.65
December 2.50 9.08 8.06 3.45
Annual 2.44 8.68 7.69 3.36
 
 
Wind power density 
The instantaneous input-output relation of wind speed and wind power potential (denoted by 

Ï is characterized by the equation 
 
Ï	+  12 ÕZ+Ö (3.7) 
where Õ is air density (kg/m³) which depends on altitude and temperature, and + is the wind 
speed that goes through an area Z (m²). Notice that wind power is an increasing return to 
scale process of wind speed. Theoretically, if one chooses a twice windier site holding all 
other factors constant, the wind power potential will be eightfold higher.   
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Since the density function of wind speed cubed can be represented by a Weibull function as 
well, mean wind power density of an area of size Z can be expressed as (see for example, 
Jamil 1995): 
 U	
Ï  ¦ 
Ï	+r	++«j 
Z2 ÕBÖΓ	1  3 R⁄   . (3.8) 
Frequently, wind power potential is expressed on a monthly or an annual basis. To arrive at 
an approximation of the wind power resources per ² over a timeframe of a month or a year 
one could simply multiply (3.8) by 730.48 and 8,765.81 respectively. 
The mean wind power density represents the potential of wind resource at a chosen site. 
Figure 13 portrays mean wind power density per unit square (i.e. Z  1) in each month at 
Osceola County. The required air density data are obtainable from the Iowa Energy Center as 
well. The estimated figures show that small differences in wind speeds are translated into 
very large deviations in wind power. The month to month wind power potential varies 
greatly; from wind classification 2 (marginal) on summer months to classification 5 
(excellent) on winter months and early spring. 
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Figure 13: Month to month mean power density at 50m for Osceola County, IA 
 
Usable wind power  
When it comes to harvesting wind power, the actual energy that can be extracted by a wind 
turbine is limited. First, regardless of technology and turbine’s design the instantaneous 
power that can be extracted from wind is bounded. According to Betz Law (Betz 1926) there 
is an upper limit of 59% for power extraction from air flows22. Secondly, wind turbines 
impose mechanical limitations as well.  
                                                          
22 Wind turbines extract energy by capturing wind speed. This suggests that for a turbine to be able to gain 
100% efficiency, its rotor should be like a brick wall. But in this case it won’t spin at all and no kinetic energy 
would be converted. On the other hand, if there was no rotor at all the wind would have passed through with no 
impact. In both cases the efficiency of the turbine is 0%.  
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The capacity of a wind turbine (denoted by 
=) in a given wind speed may be described by 
the equation 
 
=	+  Ø	+ Ã t
 (3.9) 
where t
 is the rated power of the turbine. It is generally the maximum power that a wind 
turbine can generate. Ø	+ is a non-linear function describing the turbine efficiency 
coefficient. The coefficient measures the rate at which the turbine extracts energy in different 
wind speeds relative to its rated power. The capacity of wind turbine is commonly 
characterized by a static power curve. To exemplify, we describe the operation of a typical 
modern turbine rated 1.5 MW. The minimum wind speed at which the turbine starts 
generating power at is called cut in point. For a 1.5 MW turbine, this point is usually in the 
range of 3.5-4.0 m/s. Once wind speed is higher than the cut in point, power is generated 
increasingly with wind speed. The rated speed is the speed at which the turbine is intended to 
achieve its rated power (i.e. t
). In our example, power of 1.5 MW is generated when wind 
speed is at about 12-14 m/s. At higher speeds, the turbine maintains its rated power or 
decreases its output gradually, depending on the turbine design and power control. When 
wind speed exceeds the turbine’s cut out point, the generator is shut down to avoid exposing 
the turbine to damage. Cut out point for the described turbine may be in the range of 20-25 
m/s.  
Estimation of power curves are performed based on field measurements. First, data 
measuring wind power output is plotted against wind speed. Then, an efficiency coefficient 
function Ø	+ Ù T0,1Y is fit to map wind speed into wind power. In doing so one needs to 
account for the two truncated ranges correspond to the cut in and cut out points. In these 
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ranges Ø  0 is imposed since no power is generated. At the rated speed of the turbine, its 
capacity reaches the rated power thus Ø  1. 
In figure 14 we depict a power curve of a typical 1.5MW modern turbine against the long 
averages wind speed distributions of April and July at Osceola county at height of 80m 
(which is the appropriate hub height of a typical 1.5 MW turbine). The depicted power curve 
was fitted by eye to the power curve of a particular commercial machine published by the 
manufacture (details are provided in appendix 3). The illustration magnifies the importance 
of fitting the right turbine to the wind conditions of the site in question. The monthly average 
wind speed in typical July and April is 7.05 and 8.95 respectively. Notice that in July, it is 
not very common for the turbine to run on its rated power. On April, the probability of that to 
happen is higher. The illustration shows that wind conditions in one month may be more 
suited than in other months for a turbine of this rate. 
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Figure 14: Illustration of July and April wind speed distributions at Osceola County, IA and a power 
curve of a typical modern 1.5 MW wind turbine 
 
A turbine capacity factor (:;) is the ratio between the average power generated over a 
period of time and the rated power of the turbine. More formally, it can be written as 
 :;  Ä 
=	+«j r	++t
  ¦ Ø	+r	++
«
j
  . (3.10) 
The computation of the capacity factor requires numerical integration techniques. Although 
the capacity factor is commonly used as an index to indicate the performance of a wind 
turbine, it should be regarded with caution. The fitted power curve is sensitive to the wind 
conditions at the specific site and measurement errors. Therefore, the computed capacity 
factor of a very same wind turbine may be quite different when the turbine is sited and its 
output is measured at different locations. The anticipated losses of a wind power plant are 
referred to as a loss factor, which accounts (but not limited) to downtime due to maintenance, 
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line losses, physical conditions and land use (building, trees, crops etc), and a projected 
decrease in the turbine’s efficiency over time23. 
A recent report by the U.S. Department of Energy (2009) indicates that the average U.S. 
industry capacity factor increased from 22% for projects installed prior 1998 to 35% for 
projects installed in 2007. Moreover, in the best wind resources areas, wind plants commonly 
exceed a 40% capacity factor and in some cases the capacity factor is even greater than 50%. 
The month to month variation of the computed capacity factor of our 1.5MW turbine at 
Osceola County is large (figure 15). For instance, the capacity factor attains 40% in a typical 
July month and 58% in a typical April month. These estimates ought to be adjusted down by 
the anticipated loss factor. 
The capacity factor is considered to be a good measure for the productivity of a wind turbine. 
However, its variability over time and space and the fact that the hourly price of electricity 
fluctuates as well, suggest that more inputs are required in order to assess the economic value 
of a wind turbine. 
                                                          
23
 Iowa Energy Center suggests using a default loss factor of 12%.  
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Figure 15: Monthly numerical capacity factors of a 1.5MW wind turbine sited at Osceola County, IA  
(disregarding loss factor).  
 
Regional wind power supply 
Estimating the instantaneous distribution of overall wind power supply to a power system is 
important from various engineering reasons; frequency control, coordination and operation, 
and system reserves. From an economic point of view, the expectations regarding overall 
wind power supply may impact trade in futures markets for electricity and therefore 
electricity prices. 
There are two main approaches to study overall energy flow from wind projects in a region. 
In the first, the researcher estimates the stochastic nature of the problem by investigating the 
spatial correlation of wind speed. In the next stage, wind speed data is transformed into wind 
power according to the technicalities of the specific wind turbines employed in the analysis. 
In the second approach, recorded data of wind power output produced by wind farms is used 
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directly in the analysis. The advantage of the first approach is the ability to examine the two 
stages independently. In doing so, the energy potential in a region may be analyzed according 
to various scenarios of geographical spreads of wind farms. In addition, this approach is not 
limited to the specifics of wind turbines in the region in question. Therefore, the researcher 
has the flexibility to apply a range of assumptions about the future figures of wind energy 
conversions. On the downside, the estimation in the first approach requires much more data. 
Long term records of wind speed data from as many sites as possible of the region in 
question are required to account for a spatial trend in wind speed means. Then, simultaneous 
wind speed observations from these sites are needed for the spatial modeling. Moreover, 
even if spatial correlation is ignored, extensive wind speed data is still needed. Since the 
relation between wind speed and wind power is non-linear (and truncated) the knowledge of 
average wind speeds alone are insufficient. In effect, for wind power considerations, full 
description of long-run wind speed distributions are required. 
 
Wind spatial correlation 
In a pioneering work, Haslett and Raftery (1989) estimated the daily average wind energy at 
a new site for which only a short run data was available. In doing so, long term records at 
twelve meteorological stations in Ireland were utilized. Haslett and Raftery introduced an 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model for the space-time process of 
wind speed. The model was constructed based on the assumption that the second order 
moment of the space–time process is constant. Therefore it is separable and can be written as 
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a product of the two processes. Particularly, the cross-correlation between every two 
locations has been fitted by the function  
 X"  vFÚn 1 z  .r .  Q.r .  Q (3.11) 
where " is the distance between the two sites 	., Q,  Ù T0,1Y and E w 0 are parameters.  
The empirical curve displays a strong spatial correlation (figure 16). The correlation of the 
daily average wind speed was above 0.5 even when reaching a range of 450 km between two 
locations in Ireland. The correlation level depends on the time interval which wind speeds 
observations are being averaged on. The study by Haslett and Raftery was based on daily 
average wind speeds, thus is not detailed enough for the purpose of valuing wind power. 
Since the price of electricity fluctuates greatly during the day as well, hourly wind speed data 
is more suitable.  
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 100 200 300 400 500
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
Distance (Km)
 
Figure 16: Empirical spatial correlation function of wind speed in Ireland. Source: Haslett and Raftery 
(1989) 
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At the second stage of the estimation, Haslett and Raftery approximated wind power output. 
The energy conversion ratio was oversimplified by assuming that generating wind power is 
proportion to wind power potential. Assuming that, the authors overestimated the potential 
output of wind turbines (i.e. ignoring zero output at wind speeds which are lower than the cut 
in point and higher than the cut out point). 
Cellura, et al. (2008) employed hourly data to study the spatial wind speed patterns for 
energy planning in Sicily. Specific Weibull density functions were fitted for each wind site 
and a complete geostatistics analysis was performed. The study shows how wind resources in 
a region may be evaluated taking into account the spatial nature of wind. However, Cellura, 
et al. did not consider wind power production in their study. 
Holttinen (2005) studied the hourly variation of wind power production directly. Real output 
data from the Nordic countries was utilized to examine wind energy variability in a large 
geographical scale. The cross-correlation of wind power production was fitted by the 
correlation function (3.11) for sites in an area where the maximum distance between sites is 
2,000 km (figure 17). The spatial correlation of wind power production was found to be 
strong for sites which are just a few hundred km apart, above 0.35 for sites which are 500 km 
apart and below 0.1 when the distance is about 1,200 km or more. Sinden (2007) portrayed 
very similar results studying cross-correlation between 2,080 pairs of wind power sites in the 
UK. The maximum distance between sites in that study was 1,200 km and at this range the 
correlation was also slightly under 0.1. Also depicted in figure 18, an extarpolation of spatial 
correlation functions fitted in studying wind energy in the Netherland (Gibescu, Brand and 
94 
 
 
 
Kling 2009; Landberg, et al. 1997), and a spatial correlation function fitted for a spread of 
4,500 km over locatinos in the EU (Giebel 2000). 
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Figure 17: Fitted cross correlation functions of wind power output, various studies 
 
Focken, et al. (2002) studied the effect of spatial distribution of wind farms on forecasting 
regional wind power. They considered wind power output data of about 9,000 wind turbines 
in Germany in 1999. Their study shows that the magnitude of the reduction of forecasting 
error depends only weakly on the number of wind sites and is mainly determined by the size 
of the region. Similar to the other studies, the spatial correlation of wind power was fitted by 
equation (3.11). In doing so, Focken, et al. were able to weigh the prediction improvement of 
aggregate wind power proposed by wind farms diversification. The study compared regions 
of diameter size of 370 km and 730 km. Interestingly, in both cases prediction error 
improved and reached a minimum level at around 50 turbines. A larger number of turbines 
did not enhance prediction precision. Normalizing a single site prediction error to 1, 
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prediction error in the smaller region was 0.63 while the larger region demonstrated error of 
size 0.53. 
 
Introduction to a wind-integrated electricity market 
Once wind capacity had been installed, the production of wind power is not a choice 
variable. Similar to electricity demand it is a stochastic process which may be predicted with 
some precision level. For that reason it is sensible to define the expected amount that needs 
to be generated by conventional power units as a net load. The distribution of the net load 
depends on the correlation between electricity demand and aggregate wind power production. 
Wind power output may move in the same direction as the system load in some regions while 
against it in others. However, there is no reason for the short-term fluctuations of wind power 
and system load to be related (Holttinen 2005; Wan and Liao 2006). If short-term 
fluctuations are indeed uncorrelated, expected net load may be expressed as 
 ¦ ¦ 	h  Û«
j
ÜÝ
j
reh¬hfrÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛ (3.12) 
where Û is the hourly aggregate regional wind power output, ÛÝ  is the rated regional 
capacity, ÛÞ  is the prediction of aggregate wind power and rÜ	· is the conditional 
probability distribution function of aggregate wind power. 
Integration of wind power capacity into deregulated electricity markets has two primary 
effects. While producers of conventional power face convex cost functions, the marginal cost 
of wind power is close to zero. Therefore, the regional marginal cost of producing overall 
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load is higher than the marginal cost of producing net load. Second, prediction of load minus 
available wind power has different statistical features than the prediction of overall load 
because it also includes errors in wind power predictions. The task of making correct 
predictions and balancing load under these terms is more complex since it involves stochastic 
processes of both demand and supply. Wan and Liao (2006) examine the change in the short 
term variation of load due to installation of wind power capacity. In their study 74 MW of 
wind energy (rated power) had been added to a conventional generation capacity of 1,400 
MW. This addition has the potential to account for 6% of electricity demand in peak load 
periods at the particular region of study. It was shown that at this penetration rate the increase 
in standard deviation of the net load compare to overall load is in the range of 3% in August 
to 18% in June. Looking at a six month average (June to November) an overall increase of 
8% in the standard deviation was computed.  
Recent experience of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) may emphasize the 
complexity of predicting net load24. On Tuesday evening, February 26th, 2008 an emergency 
situation was announced when a sharp decline in wind energy production in west Texas 
occurred at the same time that electricity demand soared due to a sudden decrease in 
temperature. At that time, ERCOT electricity demand increased from 31,200 MW to a peak 
of 35,612 MW. Wind power production fell from more than 1,700 MW to only 300 MW. 
During that event some industrial electricity was curtailed and the emergency situation was 
ended in three hours (which is a sufficient time to activate most gas turbines). 
                                                          
24
 ERCOT manages a region with the largest installed wind power capacity in the U.S. At the first quarter of 
2008 Texas had about 5,300 MW wind power capacity installed, and by the end of 2008 this number jumped 
to 7,118 MW. 
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In a wind-integrated electricity market, firms need to consider the conditional distribution of 
the net load in making their financial decisions. Optimization problems should be formulated 
with respect to the distribution of the spot price, which in turn, is derived from the 
distribution of net load given the forecasts. These optimization problems are the focus of our 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Theoretical framework for modeling wind-integrated electricity 
markets 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we extend the electricity market model to account for the economic 
environment of markets with significant amount of wind power capacity. A wind-integrated 
electricity market model allows us to examine and compare the outcome and welfare 
distribution subject to various assumptions regarding the path for wind power expansion. In 
particular, we expand our model to analyze two key economic questions with regard to wind 
penetration rate. First, if the electric industry experiences market power, the question who 
invests in wind capacity may be important for welfare distribution and for identifying 
potential losses caused by a non-competitive behavior. Second, geographical diversification 
of wind power plants determines the probability distribution of aggregate wind power supply. 
Hence, one could ask what effect wind power diversification has on market equilibrium.  
We examine the situation where wind power is utilized fully by the system operator in real-
time whenever it is available. This is similar to the current situation in most deregulated 
electricity markets. In these markets wind power is not being traded regularly in the day-
ahead markets therefore it is not being priced directly. Instead, wind power producers receive 
the settled spot price which is determined by the price of the marginal MW of electricity 
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produced by the marginal fossil fuel generator. That way, the ISO utilizes all available wind 
power in real-time before dispatching power from fossil fuel resources. 
The results we derive in this chapter show that even though wind power is not priced directly 
it may have a substantial impact on how electricity from fossil fuel generators is priced. This 
is particularly true when market power exists in electricity markets. In addition, the 
theoretical framework presented in this chapter is developed with accordance to the objective 
of examining the impact of wind power diversification. We attend this question after 
introducing the required numerical methodology in chapter 5. 
 
Setup 
Wind power output is not a decision variable and it is not traded in the market for forward 
contracts. Therefore, the residual power that needs to be generated by fossil fuel generators in 
real-time is a pure probabilistic matter. We denote this amount as net load.25  
Net load is exogenous to electricity markets but wind power revenues are not. Since these 
revenues are contingent on the settled spot price, wind power producers would always prefer 
a higher spot price. For this reason, the presence of market power and the ability to 
manipulate the spot price make ownership of wind power capacity a key for understanding 
how electricity is priced in a wind-integrated market. 
                                                          
25
 We assume that the net load is always positive. This is reasonable since a wind penetration rate higher than in 
the range of 20% to 30% (depending on the region) has reliability and other engineering constraints which have 
not been solved yet.  
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We start with some useful notation: recall that Û is the hourly aggregate regional wind 
power output and ÛÝ  denotes the regional rated wind power capacity. Effectively, this is the 
upper bound for aggregate wind power output in a region at a specified wind penetration rate 
(i.e. total wind power nameplate capacity in the region). The prediction of regional wind 
power at the time of trading forwards is denoted by ÛÞ , and the conditional distribution of the 
prediction of regional wind power is given by the conditional probability distribution 
function rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ f. 
Similar to the base model presented in chapter 2 (of no wind power), LSEs may choose to 
lock in (aggregately) hc units of electricity by purchasing forward contracts for the price 
c. 
But unlike the base model, the residual amount of energy that LSEs need to balance in real 
time accounts for the availability of wind power, that is h  Û  hc. Whether it is positive 
or negative, this amount would be settled against the spot price (if negative, a contract for 
differences is put into effect). After the spot market is cleared LSEs would make a monetary 
transfer of size 
^ Û to the owners of wind power capacity. 
In the following, we solve for the outcome of the two-settlement process (i.e. forwards and 
spot markets) assuming wind energy is fully utilized by the system operator in real-time. We 
compare two cases: wind power capacity is owned by IPPs (Cournot wind capacity) or by an 
independent entity or entities which do not take part in electricity markets otherwise (fringe 
wind capacity). Historically, investments in wind capacity need to be subsidized to become 
competitive therefore the distribution of revenues generated by wind power is a policy 
question. We do not analyze in this study the long run incentives to invest in wind power 
capacity. Therefore, the two cases may be viewed as the outcome of a favorable policy or 
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mandates for IPPs or other entities to invest in wind power capacity. Next, we give details 
about the optimization problems in each ownership case and the associated equilibrium 
outcomes. 
 
Cournot wind capacity 
Start by assuming that wind power capacity is part of the generation asset portfolio owned 
and operated by IPP firms. We keep the symmetric structure of the problem by assuming that 
wind power capacity is uniformly distributed among IPPs. Yet, we let realizations of wind 
power output to vary at the firm level. This in turn yields asymmetric profits. An IPP firm 
that has higher (lower) than average wind power output will have profits which are higher 
(lower) than average. 
Next, we need to acknowledge the difference in the implications of wind power forecasts at 
the aggregate and at the firm level. First, at the aggregate level, prediction of wind power 
supply provides information about the distribution of the spot price. Focusing on the 
symmetric solution, the knowledge of aggregate wind power is sufficient to foretell the spot 
price. That is because forward positions are identical across firms and competitive behavior 
in the spot market implies identical marginal costs. Therefore, similar to the base model, the 
spot price stands for the marginal cost of electricity production from conventional energy 
resources. Second, at the firm level, wind power prediction helps IPPs making more 
informed decisions about expected revenues in real-time. More about the importance of firm 
level prediction is discussed when IPP’s optimization problem is detailed. 
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Since the knowledge of firm level output is not important for the evolution of the spot price 
we can characterize the LSEs problem in terms of aggregate wind power. The LSEs 
maximization problem given the predictions of load and aggregate wind power at the time of 
trading forwards is 
  max  U ¡V]^_" ¢h,  £c6
¤
6 ,6" , ÛÞ ¥  T
`  
cYc"  
 ¦ ¦ §
`  
x ¡h,  £c6¤6 ,6" , Û¥¨
«
Ü
ÜÝ
j
 ©h  Û8  c" ª reh¬hf rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛ 
 ¦ ¦ §
`  
x ¡h,  £c6¤6 ,6" , Û¥¨
«
Ü
ÜÝ
j
 Û8 reh¬hf rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛ  .  
(4.1)  
The first two terms are the familiar expressions describing payoffs from trading electricity in 
forward and spot markets. The third term is the financial payoff for utilizing wind power in 
real-time. Substituting for the expected spot price and collecting terms we get 
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(4.2) 
Taking the derivative of the objective function with respect to the decision variable and with 
further algebraic steps we get the following FOC 

c  UT
^ 	·Y  xg8 ¦ ¦ 	h  hc
«
IÜ
reh¬hfÜÝj rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛ . (4.3) 
LSEs willingness to pay for the marginal forward contract reflects the cost they expect to 
face in order to purchase the marginal MW for their end-consumers at the spot market. This 
cost accounts for the expected spot price plus the expected penalty for not scheduling the 
marginal unit for delivery in advance (associated with turning on the marginal power 
generator). The optimality condition is integrated over all possible realizations of wind power 
output. Substituting for the deterministic case where rÜeÛ  0¬ÛÞ f  1, this FOC coincides 
with the demand curve of the base model of no wind power. In this sense the demand curves 
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developed in this section may be seen as a generalization of the one produced by the base 
model in chapter 2. 
As noted earlier, in order to analyze the IPPs problem one should account for both aggregate 
and a firm’s prediction of wind power output. The knowledge of both helps IPPs to make 
more informed decisions in the forwards market. That is because each IPP’s revenues from 
wind power depend on the distribution of its own output and the distribution of the spot price 
which is in turn depends on the distribution of aggregate wind power.  
The prediction of wind power output for the delivery period in question and rated wind 
power capacity (fixed over all periods) of each IPP firm are denoted by âã  and âÝ  
respectively. We denote the conditional probability distribution function of wind power 
output of each IPP by rÏ	zâ|âã with mean Ï and variance Ï) . Therefore the conditional pdf 
of the regional aggregate output  rÜezÛ|ÛÞ f has mean gÏ and notice that the variance is 
between gÏ)  and g)Ï) . The lower bound corresponds to the case of uncorrelated wind and 
the upper bound to the case of a fully correlated wind power output.  
If there is an aggregate smoothing effect it improves the prediction of the spot price but does 
not offer any benefit for the prediction at the firm level output. Therefore, in maximizing 
profits, each wind power producer needs to consider the statistics of its own expected output 
as well as the expected aggregate regional output. Finally, the joint conditional probability 
distribution function of wind power output at the firm level and the output at the aggregate 
level is denoted by rÏ,Üezâ, Û|ÛÞ f. 
Each IPP’s expected profits are given by  
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(4.4) 
where the last term stands for the IPPs’ expected revenues from owning wind power 
capacity.  
Express ´ with respect to the two states of the world (i.e. conventional capacity traded in 
advance is sufficient or insufficient to meet realized net load) 
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(4.5) 
Taking the first derivative 
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(4.6) 
Writing explicitly the derivatives of the spot price and the cost function 
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(4.7) 
Employing symmetry and collecting terms  
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(4.8)  
 
The FOC is 
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(4.9)  
The first derivative of the forward price with respect to quantity is 
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Solving for the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium where c  c)  k  c|  c gives 
the following optimality condition 

c	·  T
x	·Y  cÃ xg ©1  18ª ¦ ¦ reh¬hf
«
ÃIÜ
ÜÝ
j
rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛ 
x ©1  1gª ¦ ¦ 	  cÃ reh¬hf
«
ÃIÜ
ÏÝ
j
rÜezÛ|ÛÞ fhÛ 
 xg ¦ ¦ ¦ â
«
ÃIÜ
reh¬hfÜÝÏ
ÏÝ
j
rÏ,Üezâ, Û|ÛÞ fhâÛ . 
(4.11) 
It can be verified that the SOC holds in the same manner it is exemplified in the base model 
(appendix 2).  
Next, by equating aggregate inverse demand with aggregate inverse supply one can show that 
equilibrium is characterized by the aggregate number of forward contracts that solves 
(numerically) the following equation 
hcÃ  ©g8  g  8g8  g  1ª  Ä Ä hreh¬h
f«Ã IÜÜÝj rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛÄ Ä reh¬hf«Ã IÜÏÝj rÜezÛ|ÛÞ fhÛ
 © g8g8  g  1ª
 Ä Ä Ä â«ÃIÜ reh¬hfÜÝÏÏÝj rÏ,Üezâ, Û|ÛÞ fhâÛÄ Ä reh¬hf«ÃIÜÏÝj rÜezÛ|ÛÞ fhÛ    . 
(4.12) 
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Substituting this result back into the inverse demand (or inverse supply) function we get the 
equilibrium forward price 
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(4.13) 
Notice that the first term describing the equilibrium number of forwards traded is identical to 
the expression describing the equilibrium number in the base model when replacing the 
statistical properties of net load with these of overall load26. This observation is also true for 
the first two terms describing the equilibrium forward price27. The additional terms in the 
RHS of (4.12) and (4.13) are attributed to the fact that IPPs own wind power capacity.  
Revenues from wind power output are determined by the realized spot price. When 
scheduling power for delivery in advance (i.e. forward contracting) the expected spot price 
decreases due to the availability of more power generation capacity. Therefore, a higher 
volume of trade in forwards yields a lower expected spot price and thereby reduction in the 
expected revenues for wind power output. IPPs internalize the linkage between the revenues 
from the number of forward contracts they sell and the expected revenues from wind power 
                                                          
26
 Recall that the equilibrium number of forward contracts in the base model is described by 
 hcÃ  |¤I|¤|¤I|I   Ä ∞åÃ æå	|nÄ æå	|n∞åÃ   
27
 The equilibrium forward price in the base model is described by 
c	hcÃ  UT
^ 	·Y  J|¤  ¤I |¤I|I  Ä h∞Ã reh¬hfh 
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output. Therefore, IPPs’ incentive to withhold capacity in the forwards market in this case is 
higher than in the case which they do not own wind power capacity. Consequently, the 
change in the forward premium in this case represents more than just a shift from the 
statistical attributes of overall load to these of net load. It also accounts for the ability of IPPs 
to exercise excess market power when they are the owners of wind power capacity. 
 
Fringe wind capacity 
In this section we look at the situation where the owners of wind power capacity do not have 
market power or any flow of income from electricity markets other than compensation for 
their wind power output. That is to say that wind power is supplied by competitive fringe 
firms. This is a meaningful case because it includes the examples whereby a government 
agency or several small private firms invest in wind power capacity and no strategic behavior 
is involved. 
LSEs’ maximization problem in this case is similar to the case whereby wind capacity is 
owned by IPPs. The fact that the recipient of wind power payments is another entity does not 
change LSEs behavior. Therefore, the demand curve is identical to the previous case, where 
IPPs own wind capacity. 
IPPs revenues in the case of fringe capacity are based on the output of conventional power 
exclusively. Therefore the maximization problem is 
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(4.14)  
Express ´ with respect to the two states of the world 
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(4.15)  
Taking the first derivative 
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(4.16) 
Writing explicitly the derivatives of the spot price and the cost function 
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Employing symmetry and collecting terms  
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The FOC is 
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(4.19) 
Writing explicitly the IPPs’ FOC and imposing clearing market condition 
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(4.20) 
Equating aggregate inverse demand and inverse supply, the equilibrium number of forward 
contracts in this case is described by 
hcÃ  ©g8  g  8g8  g  1ª  Ä Ä hreh¬hf
«ÃIÜÜÝj rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛÄ Ä reh¬hf«ÃIÜÏÝj rÜezÛ|ÛÞ fhÛ  (4.21) 
and the forward price is  
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c	hcÃ  UT
x	·Y 
 xg8 © 8  1g8  g  1ª ¦ ¦ h
«
ÃIÜ
reh¬hfÜÝj rÜeÛ¬ÛÞ fhÛ . 
(4.22) 
Both expressions are identical to these of the base model respectively when taking into 
account the statistics of net load instead of overall load. Because wind power is owned by a 
competitive entity, no additional market power is given to IPPs and thus the resemblance 
between the equilibrium expressions in this case and these of the base model. In the case of 
fringe capacity, IPPs’ incentive to maintain a high spot price is lower than in the case that 
they are the owners of wind capacity. As a result, more forwards are being traded which 
brings relatively more conventional capacity online in advance. This in turn, lowers expected 
marginal cost and the expected spot price. 
 
Chapter summary 
In this chapter we expanded the theoretical framework to allow the modeling of wind-
integrated electricity markets. In doing so, we accounted for the decrease in the employment 
of conventional energy resources due to the availability of wind power capacity. Also, we 
modeled risk management behavior in the forwards market, which are strongly influenced by 
the new uncertainty introduced from the supply side of the market. Our analytical work 
provides transparent, traceable and robust results for equilibrium measures of electricity 
markets with wind energy. The question who invests in wind power capacity is important as 
the electric industry structure has an effect on the amount of conventional generation 
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capacity that is traded in advance, thereby impacts equilibrium prices and premiums as well. 
Our main result is that IPPs have a higher incentive to withhold capacity in the forwards 
market in the case which they are the owners of wind power capacity. Consequently, in this 
case prices of electricity in both spot and forward markets are higher compared to the case 
where wind power capacity is owned by fringe firms. 
Employing high frequency historical data, one can calibrate this model and obtain testable 
empirical results. Since the research question is about the future expansion of wind capacity, 
the required data for this purpose does not exist yet. Instead, we need to introduce the 
appropriate numerical methodology to simulate the possible paths for wind power expansion. 
This is the objective of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: A numerical method for simulating the conditional distribution 
of regional wind power output for modeling trade of short-term electricity 
forwards 
 
Introduction 
Information about future availability of overall wind energy at the power system is valuable 
for both technical and economic reasons. In this chapter we are interested in simulating the 
information that is accessible to firms for the purpose of modeling their behavior in futures 
markets for spot power. To carry out this task we need to look at the short-term distributional 
patterns of wind power forecasting because that is the timeframe for the operation of the day-
ahead markets. By that time, low resolution outputs from numerical weather prediction 
models (NWP), as well as downscaling tools (which make use of physical conditions to 
obtain higher resolution forecasting) are already accounted for. Then, statistical models take 
these predictions as inputs for shorter forecasting horizons, which is the forecasting time 
framework we are interested in simulating in this chapter. 
The initial step is attaining wind speed forecasts at the locations where wind power capacity 
is installed. Yet, simulating wind speed forecasts is not easy because one should account for 
wind speed variability and the need to predict wind speeds at several locations 
simultaneously. In addition, errors in wind speed forecasts translate into errors in wind power 
forecasting, which are translated into large errors in energy output. These forecasting errors 
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may be substantial because of the non-linear nature of the power curve. For all these reasons 
wind speed forecasts is an important part of the simulations.  
In the following we propose a novel methodology for the simulations of the uncertainty 
regarding the availability of wind power in the day-ahead market. For that purpose, we use 
the joint distribution of wind speed and wind speed forecasting, their conditional and 
marginal probability density functions, and the specifications of a wind power curve. To 
model aggregate regional wind power, we make use of a method first proposed by Iman and 
Conover (1982) to impose spatial wind correlation in the simulated region. 
 
Simulating wind speed forecasts at one location 
Consider the joint probability distribution function (pdf) of wind speed and a short-term wind 
speed forecast (e.g. day-ahead) for a particular location. Denote this pdf by rÏ,Ïã 	â, âã where 
â is wind speed and âã  is wind speed forecast. By the laws of probability this may be written 
as 
rÏ,Ïã 	â, âã  rÏ|Ïã 	â|âãrÏã 	âã (5.1) 
where rÏ|Ïã 	â|âã is the conditional pdf of wind speed given wind speed forecast, and rÏã 	âã 
is the marginal pdf of wind speed forecast. Then, the marginal pdf of wind speed is given by 
rÏ	â  ¦ rÏ|Ïã 	â|âãrÏã 	âãâãÏã  . (5.2) 
Next, assume a particular (Weibull) pdf rÏã 	âã for wind speed forecast. The assumption 
regarding the particular conditional pdf to employ in the experiment is not important for the 
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purpose of implementing the proposed method. Therefore, in line with the findings from the 
relevant literature (e.g. Giebel 2001, Landberg 1994 and Lange 2005) we assume that this 
conditional pdf is normally distributed and centered at the forecasted value. (That is, 
forecasts are unbiased). Also, we need to account for the pronounced heteroscedasticity in 
wind speeds. To be precise, we assume the variance of wind speed forecast errors is non-
decreasing in the magnitude of the forecasted value. Formally 
â|âã~8eâã, )	âãf (5.3) 
where ) âã⁄ w 0 
Then, we generate values of wind speed and wind speed forecasts by means of the following 
Monte-Carlo simulation: 
1. Make draws directly from the pdf rÏã 	âã. 
2. Use (5.3) to construct a numerical conditional pdf of wind speed rÏ|Ïã 	â|âã. Notice that 
during this process negative values of wind speed may appear. We show later how to 
avoid this problem when we parameterize the variance of â|âã . 
3. Use (5.2) to integrate over wind speed forecasts and compute the marginal pdf of wind 
speed rÏ	â. 
4. Adjust the parameters of rÏã 	âã and repeat the process till the resemblance between the 
simulated rÏ	â and the desired wind speed pdf for the experiment is within an 
acceptable range. (More details are provided in the example below). 
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Simulating wind power forecasts at one location 
We assume that all turbines in a given location experience the same wind speed. Therefore, 
wind power output at this location increases linearly in the number of turbines installed. This 
is a reasonable simplification because the correlation in wind speed within large wind farms 
is likely very high. Considerations of the aerodynamics interaction between turbines for 
maximizing power production in wind farms are discussed elsewhere (e.g. Mosetti, Poloni 
and Diviacco 1994). 
We proceed with the Monte Carlo simulation as follows: 
5. Specify a power curve of a modern wind turbine to be employed in the experiment.  
6. Use the turbine’s power curve to translate the draws of wind speed forecasts into draws 
of wind power output of each turbine. 
7. Multiply wind power output of a single turbine by the number of turbines installed to 
arrive at the aggregate output in the simulated location. 
 
Simulating wind power forecast errors at one location 
8. Draw from rÏ|Ïã 	â|âã once again to specify a particular wind speed realization in each 
simulated delivery period.  
9. Use wind speed realization to compute realized wind power output in each simulated 
period using the power curve and the number of wind turbines installed at the simulated 
location. 
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10. Integrate over wind power realizations to compute numerical capacity factor of the 
employed wind turbine.  
11. Calculate prediction error in each realization to compute mean absolute error (MAE) of 
wind power forecast across all delivery periods. 
 
Calibration and verification 
1. The performance of wind power forecasting systems is measured generally by MAE. 
This is computed as 
gZU  18 |ZBèC  ;dXFBC|
¤
   . (5.4) 
This statistic is usually reported as a percentage of total installed wind capacity or as a 
percentage of actual energy produced. Adjust the parameterization of σ)	wã such that the 
numerical MAE of wind power forecast in the experiment and the empirical MAE 
reported by the literature are the same. 
2. Verify that the numerical capacity factor of the simulated wind turbine matches the 
reports on the empirical performance of the assumed commercial wind turbine employed 
in the experiment (capacity factor is discussed in chapter 3). 
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An example of wind power simulation at one location 
Start by assuming the following pdf for the short-term wind speed forecast28  
âã~ÛF.	9.35, 2.76  . (5.5) 
The first and second moments of this distribution are 8.33 and 10.68 respectively.  
We parameterize )	âã  )âã ) and let ì)=0.05 (illustrated in figure 18)29. Setting the 
variance that way serves two purposes; first, it is realistic to assume that the variance 
increases monotonously in the magnitude of wind speed forecast, secondly, this 
parameterization produces very small errors in the case that the forecasted value is low and 
by that diminishes the likelihood of the algorithm to generate negative values of wind speed 
while constructing the conditional pdf. 
 
Figure 18: Variance of the conditional wind speed in the experiment 
 
The numerical marginal pdfs of wind speed and wind speed forecast were generated by 5,000 
draws and depicted in figure 19. 
                                                          
28
 See table 3, this is the distribution of wind speed we fitted at Osceola County, IA in a typical March. 
29
 The assumption σã)=0.05 is made only for illustration purposes at this point. However, we use this particular 
value in the numerical experiment in chapter 6 to generate a desired MAE. 
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Figure 19: Numerical marginal pdf of wind speed forecast (top) and wind speed (bottom)  
 
Table 4: Moments and parameters of the numerical marginal pdfs of wind speed and wind speed 
forecast 
 Mean Variance 
Fitted Weibull 
scale parameter 
Fitted Weibull 
shape parameter 
Wind speed forecast 8.33 10.68 9.35 2.76 
Wind speed 8.32 14.67 9.40 2.31 
 
The illustration and the point estimates (table 4) show that assuming wind speed forecast is 
distributed Weibull provide a good fit for a Weibull distribution of wind speed. The means of 
the pdfs are approximately the same. This result is expected since we employ an unbiased 
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wind speed forecast in the experiment. However, the variance of the assumed pdf for wind 
speed forecast is smaller than the variance of the pdf for wind speed. This is due to the 
introduction of the disturbance term associated with forecasting error. Our goal is to find 
values for the parameters of the Weibull function describing the forecasts, which will 
generate the desired moments of wind speed for the experiment. Notice that wind speed and 
wind speed forecast have the same mean, thus the two parameters of the Weibull pdf for 
wind speed forecasts should be a pair that generates the mean of the desired wind speed pdf. 
Since we have two parameters there is infinite number of pairs that qualify. Recall that the 
mean value of a random variable distributed Weibull is  
  BΓ	1  1 R⁄  (5.6) 
where B and R are the scale and shape parameters respectively, and Γ	· is the gamma 
function. 
The total differential is 
  B B  R R  . (5.7) 
By linear approximation, we may write 
∆  Î	1  1 R⁄ ∆B  BR)Îä	1  1 R⁄ ∆R  . (5.8) 
Since wind speed forecasting in unbiased, we impose ∆  0 and get the following 
expression 
∆B∆R  BR) Ø	1  1 R⁄  (5.9) 
where  Ø	1  1 R⁄   îï	 I Æ⁄ î	 I Æ⁄   , is the Psi function (also known as the digamma function). 
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Equation (5.9) provides an expression for the relation between the pairs of Weibull 
parameters that approximate the same mean as that of the particular pair R and B. As long as 
we change B and R with accordance to condition (5.9) we know that the mean of the two 
marginal distributions remains approximately the same. The next step is to pick a pair that 
provides us with the desired variance for the target pdf of wind speed. This is not a difficult 
task, which may be accomplished by a standard numerical search technique. For example, a 
simple computation shows that if we wanted to generate a pdf of wind speed which is similar 
to the estimated March hourly wind speed distribution in Osceola County (eq. 5.5), we 
should start the Monte Carlo simulation by assuming âã~ÛF.	9.26, 3.51. 
To convert simulated values of wind speed to wind power output a power curve of a modern 
1.5 MW turbine is used. This curve is depicted in chapter 3 (figure 14). A wind turbine of 
this rate is chosen as it is a fairly large machine which is appropriate for regions with 
excellent conditions of wind resources (wind speed between 7.5 and 8 m/s at 50 m height). 
Larger commercial machines which are suited for outstanding (8-8.8 m/s) or superb (>8.8 
m/s) wind conditions may be considered as well. However, study on the penetration rate of 
wind power capacity requires that the employed turbine size in the experiment should be with 
accordance to the availability of spatial wind power resources. Regions of outstanding and 
superb wind conditions in the U.S. are scarce and many of them do not provide any certainty 
of delivering stable large flow of wind power during most months and for a large 
geographical dispersion.  
Next, we want to examine how the magnitude of wind speed forecast influences the 
distribution of wind power forecast (figure 20). While the conditional pdfs of wind speed in 
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all cases are Gaussian by assumption, the shape of the conditional pdf of wind power is far 
from being Gaussian. It varies by the magnitude of the forecasted value and has no 
recognizable form. The reason for that is the nonlinear nature of the power curve. For 
example, wind power output is truncated on both sides. Namely, for periods with wind speed 
forecasts from the tails of the distribution, the probability of zero wind power output is high. 
If the forecasted value is sufficiently low, it is expected that wind speed would not exceed the 
cut-in point and therefore it most likely that no power would be generated. This is described 
in figure 20 by the case that the wind speed forecast is 2 m/s. Likewise, a high forecasted 
value entails higher probability that the turbine may attain its cut-off point, and cease power 
generation to protect itself from damage. That is depicted in figure 20 in the case of wind 
speed forecast of 25 m/s. Recall that 25 m/s is the cut-off speed, therefore it is shown that 
about half of the time the turbine generates its rated power and in the rest nothing. For wind 
speeds between the cut- in point and 14 m/s which is the rated-speed (wind speed at which 
the turbine generates its rated power) the power curve is convex, which implies that small 
deviations in wind speed in this segment yields large asymmetric deviations of wind power. 
Those are reflected by the depicted graphs for wind speed forecasts of 5, 8, 12 and 16 m/s in 
figure 20. 
Our results show that the conditional pdfs of wind power forecasting error are not Gaussian. 
However, integrating out the forecasts, the unconditional distribution of forecasting error 
seems like a dense normal distribution (figure 21). This result is in line with several empirical 
studies that show that wind power prediction errors may be represented (at least) loosely by a 
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Gaussian distribution (see Blatchford and Zack 2004, Loutan and Hawkins 2007, Madsen et 
al. 2004, and Pinson and Kariniotakis 2004).30 
For modeling trading decisions, it is the conditional distribution of wind power forecasting 
errors that is important. That is because financial consequences of trading decisions in futures 
markets are drawn from the distribution of wind power given a short-term forecast. 
Averaging over the 5,000 draws (periods) in the experiment, we compute wind power plants’ 
capacity factor of 51% and mean absolute error as percentage of installed capacity of 14%. 
 
  
                                                          
30
 Blatchford and Zack (2004) and Loutan and Hawkins (2007) studied the predictions of the central wind 
forecasting system in California ISO. Pinson and Kariniotkais (2004) presented forecast errors for a case study 
of a single wind farm in Ireland. Finally, Madsen et al. (2004) studied the performances of more than 10 
prediction systems in Europe as part of a project of the European Union Commission. 
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UTâ|âãY = 2 m/s 
 
UTâ|âãY = 5 m/s 
 
UTâ|âãY = 8 m/s 
 
UTâ|âãY = 12 m/s 
 
UTâ|âãY = 16 m/s 
 
UTâ|âãY = 25 m/s 
Figure 20: Conditional wind speed, the associated conditional wind power distributions and the 
distributions of wind power forecasting error given wind speed forecasts of 2, 5, 8, 12, 16 and 25 m/s 
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Figure 21: The unconditional distribution of wind power forecasting error at one location (kW) 
 
 
Aggregate regional wind power output 
In the following we consider a study region composed of several wind site locations where 
there is a short-term wind speed forecast available at each location. The goal is to simulate 
wind speed forecasts and realizations that are consistent with correlated forecasts and the 
spatial nature of wind speed.  
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In general, the forecasting error of wind power output from several sites is lower than 
forecasting errors from a single site. How fast and to what extent these errors are reduced 
with the addition of wind capacity depends primarily on the size of the region and how 
spatially correlated wind is in the region. The geographical distribution of wind farms in a 
region determines the distribution of regional wind power output. 
For the purpose of imposing spatial correlation we employ a method that was introduced by 
Iman and Conover (IC) in 1982. The method is used in a large variety of applications where 
there is a need to generate correlated random numbers (see for example, Brus and Jansen 
2004, Hart, Hayes and Babcock 2006, Maia and Neto 2004, and Wu and Tsang 2004). The 
technique is distribution free, preserves the exact form of the marginal distributions on the 
input variables and simple to use. The theoretical basis of the IC method is that independent 
random numbers drawn from independent marginal distributions can be sorted to comply 
with any desired rank correlation matrix. 
Let Z be a R by  matrix corresponded to R draws from  independent marginal 
distributions. If : is a target correlation matrix for Z then we know that since : is positive 
definite and symmetric, there exists a lower triangular matrix 
 such that 

’  : and Z
ä 
has the target correlation matrix :. This is the theoretical basis for the IC method. 
The objective is to find a rank correlation matrix g that is sufficiently close to the desired 
correlation matrix :. In order to do so, the IC method requires defining a score matrix. For 
the score matrix, Iman and Conover (1982) suggest using ranks, random normal deviates or 
van der Waerden scores. We adopt the latter method which is employed in the original paper. 
Let t be a R by  score matrix where each of its columns comprise from a random mix of the 
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van der Waerden scores. That is a	.  Φ e./	8  1f for .  1 … 8, where Φ  is the 
inverse function of the standard normal distribution. Then, find a lower triangular 
, which is 
associated with the target correlation matrix :. Two common ways to compute 
 are through 
Cholesky factorization and singular value decomposition. The score matrix t is multiplied 
by 
ç to transform its columns such that the transformed matrix, denoted by tÃ, has a rank 
correlation g which is close to :. 
To improve the similarity between the matrices g and :, Iman and Conover (1982) suggests 
proceeding as follows. The difference between g and : is explained partially by t not 
having a sample correlation equal to the identity matrix ò. The goal is to decrease the 
variance of the transformation matrix in order to reduce the dissimilarity. For that purpose, a 
matrix ó should be found such that ó9ó’  : where 9 is the sample correlation of t. First, 
compute a lower triangular > such that 9  >>’. Then, recall that :  

’, so we can 
write ó>>’ó’  

’. From that we know that ó>  
 or ó  
> . Therefore, the matrix 
denoted by tôÃ  tóä has the exact correlation matrix : and a rank correlation gÃ, which is 
closer to : than g is. 
While the implementation of the IC method for our purpose is straightforward, we need to 
explain how to derive the matrix : to simulate spatial correlation in our application. Start, by 
defining a study region for the experiment. In theory, the shape of the study region is 
relatively unimportant as long as it is not too small to capture the full range of spatial 
variation in the underlying process (Diggle and Ribeiro 2007). Let õ be a square lattice which 
is divided into  by  symmetric locations 
132 
 
 
 
õ  §õ , k õ ,6ö ÷ öõ6, k õ6,6¨ 
(5.10) 
Denote by ∆ the side length of each location. Notice that ∆ is also the Euclidean distance 
between the centers of any two orthogonal nearest neighbor locations (likewise, √2∆ is the 
Euclidean distance between the centers of any two diagonal nearest neighbor locations). 
The next step is to specify the stochastic nature of the spatial process. For example, if wind 
speed experiences the same distribution at all locations, and spatial correlation depends only 
on the distance between locations then the process is stationary. Conversely, wind speed may 
experience spatial trend. For instance, differences in the mean may be explained by the 
coordinates of the location on the study region. Another example for non-stationarity is due 
to the existence of directional effects on the correlation structure. Notice that our theoretical 
framework does not put any restrictions on the structure of the spatial correlation to be 
employed in the numerical experiment. Spatial correlation may be described by any function 
of the Euclidean distance, the coordinates of õ or other factors affecting the ) by ) 
correlation matrix :. 
Next, we make ) draws from the pdf rÏã 	âã in each simulation. These are the (unsorted) 
wind speed forecasts at ) locations. Each draw is used as row entries in a matrix denoted 
as Z. Suppose we make R draws in the experiment, Z’s dimensions are R by ).  
Once matrices Z and : are defined, the IC method can be applied for imposing spatial 
correlation among local wind speed forecasts. The imposition of spatial correlation on the 
forecasts is reasonable because forecasting systems run on low resolution models as first step 
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and therefore use predictions of regional scale events as inputs before physical downscaling 
tools31 are being implemented.  
After we generate local wind speed forecasts, we proceed with the Monte Carlo simulation in 
each location as elucidated earlier. That way, we obtain local and aggregate conditional pdfs 
of the short-term wind power forecasting. Those are valuable for us as they will be used as 
inputs for modeling traders’ decision making in the next chapter.  
 
An example of simulating spatially correlated wind 
Generally, wind speed should be considered as a non-stationary spatial process because of 
the physical conditions which are never entirely homogenous over a geographical region. 
However, since our experiment does not relate to a specific region, we would not want to put 
restrictions at this stage on the analysis. As argued earlier, for applied purposes, one can 
impose any specific spatial wind structure to this framework without adding complexity to 
the analysis.  
Assuming stationarity, the Euclidean distances alone are sufficient to construct the desired 
correlation matrix :. We carry on our example with an exponential correlation function since 
this is the one that is commonly chosen to describe wind spatial correlation (see references in 
chapter 3).  Ignoring a nugget effect, the correlation function is 
                                                          
31
 Physical downscaling tools refer to the utilization of high resolution spatial data such as topography and 
roughness to refine forecasting at the site level. 
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X"  FÚn   (5.11) 
where " is the Euclidean distance between any two locations . and Q, and the value of the 
parameter E (known as the characteristic distance) needs to be calibrated.  
Let   10 and ∆ 100 km, with a region of size 1,000 km², which is divided into 100 wind 
locations. The literature regarding wind spatial correlation is quite limited and the few 
empirical studies reviewed earlier, are about wind statistics in European countries (see 
chapter 3). In line with this literature we set E  0.002. The spatial correlation of wind speed 
for the experiment is illustrated in figure 22.  
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Figure 22: Wind spatial correlation in the experiment 
  
Making use of the spatial correlation function while accounting for the coordinates of wind 
locations we compute the correlation matrix :. That is the correlation to be imposed while 
simulating wind speed forecasts in the region study. 
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The Monte Carlo experiment consists of 5,000 draws. We draw independently for all wind 
locations from the pdf of wind speed forecast that is used in previous example (eq. 5.5). That 
gives us a matrix Z of 5000 by 100 random draws. To generate the score matrix t we 
randomize the van der Waerden scores in each column. The required lower triangular 
matrices 
 and > are computed by Cholesky factorizations. Deriving the matrix denoted by 
tôÃ  we get the exact correlation matrix : and a rank correlation gÃ. Finally, each column of 
Z is resorted according to the ranks in the columns of tôÃ . Doing so, we generate rank 
correlation  gÃ among the columns of Z while preserving the marginal distributions of the 
forecasts in each wind location.  
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Table 5: Wind speed forecasts: target correlation (top) simulated correlation of wind speed forecast 
(center) and simulated correlation of wind speed realization (bottom) 
 … õÖ  õÖ) õÖÖ õÖÌ õÖø õÖù õÖú õÖû õÖü õÌj õÌ … 
ö õÖ  1 
0.8187 
0.8062 
0.5895 
0.6703 
0.6602 
0.4779 
0.5488 
0.5389 
0.4090 
0.4493 
0.4464 
0.3240 
0.3679 
0.3591 
0.2835 
0.3012 
0.2972 
0.2251 
0.2466 
0.2411 
0.1762 
0.2019 
0.1924 
0.1423 
0.1653 
0.1597 
0.0982 
0.8187 
0.8069 
0.6004 õÖ) 
 1 
0.8187 
0.8099 
0.5886 
0.6703 
0.6577 
0.4984 
0.5488 
0.5391 
0.3859 
0.4493 
0.4346 
0.3174 
0.3679 
0.3585 
0.2620 
0.3012 
0.2899 
0.2135 
0.2466 
0.2326 
0.1731 
0.2019 
0.1921 
0.1368 
0.7536 
0.7396 
0.5431 õÖÖ 
  1 
0.8187 
0.8076 
0.5862 
0.6703 
0.6565 
0.4712 
0.5488 
0.5327 
0.4057 
0.4493 
0.4365 
0.3278 
0.3679 
0.3530 
0.2615 
0.3012 
0.2853 
0.2059 
0.2466 
0.2313 
0.1760 
0.6394 
0.6250 
0.4555 õÖÌ 
   1 
0.8187 
0.8065 
0.6040 
0.6703 
0.6519 
0.5056 
0.5488 
0.5353 
0.3937 
0.4493 
0.4280 
0.3425 
0.3679 
0.3467 
0.2726 
0.3012 
0.2852 
0.2319 
0.5313 
0.5207 
0.4020 õÖø 
    1 
0.8187 
0.8032 
0.5931 
0.6703 
0.6533 
0.4790 
0.5488 
0.5254 
0.3980 
0.4493 
0.4259 
0.3258 
0.3679 
0.3523 
0.2669 
0.4384 
0.4350 
0.3160 õÖù 
     1 
0.8187 
0.8080 
0.5987 
0.6703 
0.6465 
0.4896 
0.5488 
0.5204 
0.3889 
0.4493 
0.4284 
0.3270 
0.3607 
0.3487 
0.2820 õÖú 
      1 
0.8187 
0.7995 
0.5986 
0.6703 
0.6421 
0.4886 
0.5488 
0.5262 
0.4084 
0.2962 
0.2873 
0.2214 õÖû 
       1 
0.8187 
0.8029 
0.5953 
0.6703 
0.6550 
0.4896 
0.2431 
0.2362 
0.1759 õÖü 
        1 
0.8187 
0.8085 
0.6067 
0.1994 
0.1879 
0.1371 õÌj 
         1 
0.1635 
0.1538 
0.1158 õÌ  ö           1 
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Table 6: Simulated wind power correlation; forecasts (top) and realizations (bottom) 
 … õÖ  õÖ) õÖÖ õÖÌ õÖø õÖù õÖú õÖû õÖü õÌj õÌ … 
ö õÖ  1 
0.7863 
0.5707 
 
0.6297 
0.4508 
 
0.4980 
0.3835 
 
0.4013 
0.2996 
 
0.3340 
0.2556 
 
0.2785 
0.2003 
 
0.2186 
0.1566 
 
0.1807 
0.1378 
 
0.1576 
0.0999 
 
0.7852 
0.5800 
 õÖ) 
 1 
0.7835 
0.5476 
 
0.6189 
0.4572 
 
0.4958 
0.3484 
 
0.4120 
0.2900 
 
0.3430 
0.2431 
 
0.2674 
0.1978 
 
0.2271 
0.1691 
 
0.1925 
0.1384 
 
0.7171 
0.5094 
 õÖÖ 
  1 
0.7834 
0.5731 
 
0.6198 
0.4454 
 
0.5045 
0.3751 
 
0.4161 
0.3052 
 
0.3321 
0.2294 
 
0.2784 
0.2056 
 
0.2334 
0.1737 
 
0.5993 
0.4342 
 õÖÌ 
   1 
0.7758 
0.5742 
 
0.6272 
0.4767 
 
0.5087 
0.3735 
 
0.4063 
0.3045 
 
0.3358 
0.2584 
 
0.2722 
0.2145 
 
0.4849 
0.3759 
 õÖø 
    1 
0.7849 
0.5671 
 
0.6238 
0.4510 
 
0.5013 
0.3681 
 
0.4151 
0.3065 
 
0.3361 
0.2496 
 
0.3992 
0.3009 
 õÖù 
     1 
0.7869 
0.5666 
 
0.6339 
0.4625 
 
0.5152 
0.3760 
 
0.4204 
0.3101 
 
0.3340 
0.2720 
 õÖú 
      1 
0.7884 
0.5734 
 
0.6319 
0.4653 
 
0.5117 
0.3938 
 
0.2793 
0.2219 
 õÖû 
       1 
0.7871 
0.5758 
 
0.6257 
0.4616 
 
0.2218 
0.1593 
 õÖü 
        1 
0.7840 
0.5823 
 
0.1771 
0.1393 
 õÌj 
         1 
0.1507 
0.1099 
 õÌ  ö           1 
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The top entry in each cell in table 5 shows the target correlation matrix : for (randomly 
depicted) locations 31 to 41. For instance, looking at the first row we see how the correlation 
dies slowly as we go from left to right (or west to east with regard to the study region õ). The 
correlation of locations 31 and 41 is high again since they are located on top of each other 
in õ. The second entry in each cell of the table is the correlation we get by imposing rank 
correlation on wind speed forecasts. The difference between the target and the simulated 
correlations of forecasts shows that the IC method provides a practical approximation for the 
desired spatial correlation. The third entry in each cell is the correlation between the marginal 
pdfs of local wind speed. This correlation is lower than the correlation of the forecast because 
we impose the spatial correlation on the forecasts. As explained earlier, this is realistic 
because forecasting systems make predictions that are drawn from the forecasting of regional 
scale events.  
In table 6 we depict the results for wind power spatial correlations. The relation between the 
correlations of wind power forecast and wind power realization is similar to the 
corresponding relation between the correlations of wind speed. However, due to the non-
linearity of the conversion rate of the power curve the spatial correlations of wind power 
forecasts and realizations are lower than these of wind speed respectively. 
Finally, we look at the conditional distribution of aggregate regional wind power output. This 
distribution depends on the spatial smoothing effect in the region. Since wind statistics and 
other characteristics of a particular region are specifications which may vary greatly, we 
employ a broader approach in our analysis. The illustrations include the particular spatial 
correlation assumed so far in the experiment (figure 22) and two boundary cases. One is a 
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fully diversified wind case which refers to a zero correlation of wind power in any level of 
output. It may describe a region which is sufficiently large to accommodate wind power 
capacity so it is not influenced by spatial correlation. The second is an undiversified wind 
case. This is parallel to scaling up the capacity of a single wind farm since in this case the 
region does not offer any spatial smoothing effects. 
While most likely no real-world region complies with either of the two boundary cases, 
observing the range of results spanned by these two is practical. It provides an indication of 
the importance of diversifying wind power production and demonstrates the impacts of 
spatial correlation that can provide insights into particular regions. 
Geographical diversification of wind power may reduce the productivity of wind turbines if 
less windy areas are developed. In our simulations we do not account for a potential decrease 
in a capacity factor due to wind diversification. Doing so, we are able to observe all possible 
outcomes with no prior restrictions. More applied work ought to take this factor into 
consideration but we do not impose it. In this sense the fully diversified wind case represent 
the most efficient expansion path possible for regional wind capacity. 
We assume a single 1.5 MW wind turbine in every location, thus the rated regional wind 
capacity in our illustration is 150 MW. The marginal pdf of wind power forecast is depicted 
in figure 23. Looking at the illustrated distributions it is clear that spatial correlation has a 
significant impact on the statistical properties of aggregate regional wind power. In the case 
that wind is uncorrelated the forecast is normally distributed. For the particular correlation 
imposed in the experiment (figure 22) we see that a smoothing effect takes place but not to 
the extent that the marginal distribution becomes Gaussian. Particularly, the variance of the 
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forecast is much higher than the previous case. Finally, if the region does not offer any 
smoothing effects the distribution of the forecast is very uneven. To be precise, the likelihood 
of getting values that are not from the tails of the distribution is relatively small. Because 
wind is fully correlated, the distribution in this case reflects the relatively high probabilities 
of local wind speed being below the cut in point or above the turbine’s rated speed. 
Looking at the conditional distribution of wind power we get an interesting result. In figure 
24 we depict selected conditional pdfs to exemplify low, intermediate and high wind power 
forecasts (recall that we generate 5,000 conditional pdfs in the experiment). While all three 
distributions are Gaussian-like, it seems that using the wind power value implied by the 
forecasted values of wind speed introduces bias in wind power forecasting. This is especially 
true in the cases of low and high forecasted values. A forecast in the case of wind speed 
between the extremes is more dependable since the transformation of speed to power is less 
likely to be truncated by the power curve at this range. When we integrate over all forecats 
we find that transforming expected wind speed to wind power generates a relatively small 
prediction bias (the average error in the experiment is about 3 MW, which is less than 2.5% 
of installed capacity). This result is due the fact that wind power output is truncated from 
both sides. 
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Figure 23: Marginal pdfs of wind power forecast; no correlation (left), some correlation (center) and 
full correlation (right) 
 
Power implied by forecasted wind 
speed  ≈ 25 MW  
Power implied by forecasted wind 
speed  ≈ 45 MW  
Power implied by forecasted 
wind speed  ≈ 120 MW  
Figure 24: Conditional pdf of wind power, imposing some correlation; low (left), intermediate 
(center) and high wind power forecasts (right) 
 
 
Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we develop a numerical methodology to simulate the uncertainty regarding 
future wind power availability at the time of trading short-term electricity forwards. The 
methodology is relatively simple and independent of any specifications of wind speed 
conditions, spatial correlation, wind energy conversion, and wind power penetration rate. 
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Thus, it can accommodate a large array of assumptions regarding the paths for wind power 
expansion. The IC method, which is commonly applied to construct rank correlation among 
random variables, is used in this study for the purpose of inducing spatial correlation. Since 
geographical regions are very different and no concrete wind speed data is available to us at 
this time, the method is exemplified avoiding any subjective assumptions.  
The conditional distribution of wind power derived from wind speed forecasts at one location 
has no identifiable form. Moreover, the technical nature of the power curve makes it 
necessary to examine every wind speed forecast individually because some wind speed 
forecasts are associated with higher wind power variability than others. In periods of very 
low wind speeds it is almost certain that the turbines will generate zero output. Forecasts that 
are higher than the turbine’s rated speed but not too close to the cut-off point are very likely 
to generate the rated power. Other values of wind speed forecasts generate peculiar 
conditional distributions of wind power as well. This result is consequential; it means that in 
some trading periods traders face more uncertainties than in others. We show that spatial 
correlation is a main factor determining the uncertainty in aggregate wind power forecasting. 
The distribution of aggregate output may be U-shaped in the case of no smoothing effects, 
normal in the case of highly correlated wind or with no conforming shape in the case of some 
degree of spatial correlation. Therefore, the particular densities of aggregate wind power 
created by a short-term wind forecasting must be accounted for in modeling electricity 
markets with wind power capacity. The numerical work developed in this chapter, coupled 
with the theoretical economic framework introduced earlier, complete the required state of 
knowledge to model wind-integrated electricity markets.   
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Chapter 6: Modeling equilibrium in wind-integrated electricity markets 
 
Introduction 
The theoretical framework and the numerical methodology developed in previous chapters 
enable the analysis of various scenarios of wind power integration. In this chapter we 
generate and discuss results which are based on a particular set of assumptions. The 
assumptions regarding the structure of the electric industry and load are the ones we used 
earlier for the illustration of the base model in chapter 2. Assumptions regarding the features 
of the study region, wind speed statistics, wind power technology and forecasting quality are 
drawn from the related literature, recent technical reports and the analysis of wind speed data 
in Iowa. 
Since the specifics of electricity markets in different regions vary greatly, the results 
presented in this chapter should not be seen as a general guideline but rather an example of 
how to go about modeling equilibrium outcomes in the new economic environment of wind-
integrated electricity markets. A more applied work should use this theoretical framework 
while employing the characteristics of a particular region in question. For instance, assuming 
a particular industry structure refines the modeling of market power in the associated region. 
Second, the cost parameters of generating power in the model can be calibrated to fit a 
particular regional supply curve. Third, for concrete predictions it will be required to evaluate 
empirically and employ the specifics of wind resources as well the precision of the central 
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forecasting system in the region in question. While the theoretical framework developed here 
is flexible to accommodate various applied questions regarding wind power integration, we 
focus in our simulations on two key questions. The first is the impact that ownership of wind 
power capacity has on market equilibrium. The second is what role wind power 
diversification plays on equilibrium prices. 
 
Simulation setup 
Overall load 
The integration of wind power is our main interest therefore we fix the forecasted value of 
overall load across all simulations. This allows us to control for variations in the predictions 
of the model caused by the variations of overall load. The conditional pdf of overall load 
employed in the experiment is h|h~8	10,000, 500) i.e. the expected load for the modeled 
delivery period is 10,000 MW with standard deviation of 5%. This amounts to a mean 
absolute error (MAE) of 4% of total power when forecasting overall load at the day-ahead 
market. 
Industry structure 
There are five IPP firms and five LSE firms in the study region, i.e. g  8  5. 
Production costs 
The cost parameters of generating power are   1 and x  2. It is useful to compute the 
cost of generating power in our experiment before wind power is introduced. In particular, 
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we look at the marginal cost in the event that load is fully hedged by forwards contracts. This 
is relevant because it stands for the most efficient production scheme of one hour power 
supply in the simulated economy. Employing the cost function and symmetry, the expected 
marginal cost is 20 $/MWh and total short-run generation costs of each IPP is $40,000.  
Wind power 
A careful modeling of the expansion of wind power capacity demands that the probability 
distribution function of aggregate wind power output in the experiment would not 
overestimate the potential of wind power in the study region. As penetration rate increases it 
is only expected that less windy areas would be developed. For that reason we choose a 
location in center Iowa to generate a representative wind speed pdf for our study region. It is 
shown in chapter 3 that wind power resources in Iowa increases as one goes North-West 
therefore the fitted pdf of wind speed in center Iowa is a sensible choice for modeling wind 
power potential. More specifically, we estimate wind speed pdf at Zearing, where a large 
wind farm has been constructed in portions of Story and Hardin Counties in Iowa. When 
fully developed, this wind farm is planned to have the potential of generating 150 MWh32. 
Making use of data published by Iowa Energy Center we estimate the annual hourly pdf of 
wind speed at hub height of 80 m at Zearing as â~ÛF.	8.28, 2.41. The mean and the 
standard deviation of this pdf is 7.34 and 3.25 m/s respectively (depicted in figure 25). 
In order to simulate the marginal pdf of wind speed in Zearing in our experiment we make 
use of the numerical methodology developed in chapter 5. Recall that in doing so we need to 
                                                          
32
 At this time, bilateral contracts are signed to deliver 30 MWh to the city of Ames and 6 MWh to Iowa State 
University. The purchase represents roughly 15% and 10% shares of overall electricity consumption 
respectively. 
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parameterize the conditional pdf of wind speed â|âã~8eâã, 	âãf and to solve for the 
parameters of the marginal pdf of wind speed forecast, which in turn generates the desired 
marginal pdf of wind speed.  
To construct the conditional pdf of wind speed we need to look at the precision of modern 
wind forecasting systems. Nowadays, wind power forecasting models are able to provide 
unbiased forecasts (Madsen, et al. 2004). On the other hand, MAE at one wind site location 
for a prediction horizon of day-ahead is still substantial. For instance, for wind farms 
participating in California ISO’s central forecasting system33 MAE is 17.5% of installed 
capacity (Blatchford and Zack 2004). MAE in different locations in Europe is about 13% of 
installed capacity (Madsen, et al. 2004). The most recent report available at this time 
indicates 10%-12% MAE of installed capacity for a single site (Smith 2008). Considering the 
particularities employed in these studies, e.g. wind farms technology, geographical 
characteristics of wind and more the results do not diverge dramatically. 
Taking these figures into consideration, we set â|âã~8	âã, 0.05âã ) and generate the 
marginal pdf of local wind speed by a particular marginal pdf of wind speed forecasts, which 
is âã~ÛF.	8.24, 2.93. Recall that by employing the Iman-Conover method we are able to 
impose any degree of spatial correlation while preserving the exact marginal pdf of wind 
speed forecast across all simulations. Therefore, we are able to draw sample of wind speed 
forecasts only once and use the very same one in all simulations. That way, we avoid the 
intrinsic variation related to the sampling of wind speed forecasts. 
                                                          
33
 The central forecasting system Participating Intermittent Resources Program (PIRP) was created by 
California ISO in 2003. 
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The chosen wind turbine in the experiment is similar to the 1.5 MW turbines installed in the 
wind farm in Zearing. The particular power curve of the employed machine is portrayed in 
figure 25. Finally, wind turbine output in the experiment are discounted by a loss factor of 
12%, which is the figure proposed by the Iowa Energy Center (see chapter 3 for details). 
Taking the particular wind conditions and the loss factor into consideration, the capacity 
factor of the illustrated turbine in the experiment is 36.74%. The computed MAE at the day-
ahead for a single wind site in our simulations is 14%. 
Study region and spatial correlation 
We simulate a square lattice which is similar to the one exemplified in chapter 5: a grid of 10 
by 10 wind site locations with side length of 100 km each to form a region study of 1,000 
km². Spatial correlation is assumed to be stationary and modeled as an exponential function 
of the Euclidian distance between locations (see eq. 5.11). We simulate three cases of wind 
spatial correlation: no correlation, some degree of positive correlation and full correlation. 
This is accomplished by setting the value of the parameter E (the characteristic distance) 
appropriately and imposing rank correlation accordingly.  
Regional wind power capacity and wind power penetration rate 
Rated wind capacity specifies the upper bound for the hourly output of wind energy in the 
study region. The expansion of wind power capacity is performed in the experiment by a 
symmetric increase in the number of wind turbines in each location. In particular, we focused 
on the following figures: 5, 10, and 20 turbines in each location which correspond to 
simulating wind capacity that account for 7.5%, 15%, and 30% of the expected load. We 
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illustrate and discuss in details only the results for the case of 30% since our key findings can 
be observed when simulating wind capacity at this scale.  
Wind power penetration rate is defined here as the share of forecasted wind power of the 
expected load in a particular delivery period. Notice that the actual share may be higher than 
the rated capacity if realized load is lower than expected. If realized load is higher than 
expected, wind penetration rate is always lower than the rated capacity. 
General 
In line with the empirical studies discussed in chapter 3, we assume that the hourly 
distributions of wind power and load are uncorrelated. All the numerical results consist of 
500 draws of 100 local wind speed forecasts (i.e. 500 delivery periods). Conditional pdfs of 
load and local wind speed for each delivery period consist of 500 draws as well. 
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Figure 25: Fitted annual hourly wind speed pdf in Zearing, IA and the power curve of a 1.5 MW 
turbine employed in the experiment 
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Results 
The following are the results of a computational experiment that examine the market 
equilibrium which arises from modeling regional rated wind power capacity of 3,000 MW 
(i.e. wind power capacity accounts for 30% of the expected load). Recall that for presentation 
purposes, we denote wind power capacity in the case that it is owned by IPPs as a Cournot 
capacity and in the case that wind is owned by competitive firms as a fringe capacity. 
The results by ownership of wind capacity and for the three cases of wind diversification are 
depicted in figure 26-28. It is shown that in all three cases of wind diversification fewer 
contracts are being traded if wind capacity is owned by IPPs. Looking at the illustration for 
the case of undiversified wind (figure 26, top), the two series reflect similar trend. The only 
difference is that the Cournot capacity case demonstrates a slight reduction in the equilibrium 
number of forwards before a sharp increase takes place. The increase happens at the region 
where net load approaches the volume of power hedged by forwards contracts. This is 
because the probability of starting up generators in real-time decreases fast in wind 
penetration rate in this region. For the fringe case, at about 19% wind penetration rate the 
number of forwards hit a saturation point. For the Cournot case this point is reached only at 
about 23% wind penetration rate. The saturation points are related to the fact that at these 
wind penetration rates the expected forward premiums are exhausted respectively (discussed 
further below). 
When we look at the case that wind experiences some spatial correlation (figure 26, center) 
the saturation point in the case of fringe capacity is reached at about 21% wind penetration 
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rate. On the other hand, for the Cournot capacity the number of forwards has not reached a 
saturation point in the experiment. Moreover, the increase in the number of forwards in this 
case is less obvious than in the case of the fringe capacity. Finally, if there is no spatial 
correlation there is a noticeable increase in the share of forwards for the fringe capacity case 
but for the Cournot capacity case there is no clear trend (figure 26, bottom). The fully 
diversified case enjoys smoothing effects hence is less likely to generate extreme realizations 
of regional wind power output. The 500 wind speed forecasts at 100 wind site locations in 
the experiment are translated into a relatively narrow range of 9.1% to 13.3% wind 
penetration rate. As a result, there is not much variability in the volume of trade in forwards 
contracts in both cases of ownership.  
151 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Forecasted wind power penetration rate and the share of forwards of expected load; full 
correlation (top) some correlation (middle) and zero correlation (bottom)  
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Figure 27: Forecasted wind power penetration rate and expected spot price; full correlation (top) 
some correlation (middle) and zero correlation (bottom)  
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Figure 28: Forecasted wind power penetration rate and expected forward premium; full correlation 
(top) some correlation (middle) and zero correlation (bottom) 
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The graphs in figures 27-28 depict the prices associated with the quantities presented in the 
graphs in figure 26 respectively. We plot forecasted wind penetration rate against expected 
spot price (figure 27) and against expected forward premium (figure 28). Starting with the 
spot price, the linear curves in the graphs are fitted to describe the relationship between the 
expected spot price and the expected wind penetration rate (denoted in the equations as 
wind). In periods that forecasted wind penetration rate is zero the expected spot price is 27.71 
$/MWh. The difference between this price and the marginal cost of 20 $/MWh computed 
earlier is explained by the fact that the higher figure corresponds to the actual forwards 
positions taken in equilibrium. 
The trend in the spot price caused by wind penetration rate is very similar across all three 
levels of wind diversification: first, the expected spot price decreases in wind penetration rate 
rapidly since the availability of wind energy reduces the marginal cost of generating power in 
the region. In our illustration, an increase of 1% in wind penetration rate causes a decrease of 
about 0.6 $/MWh in the expected spot price. Second, the expected spot price is higher in the 
case of Cournot capacity than in the case of the fringe capacity because the number of 
forwards traded is higher in the latter. The coefficients of the spot price equations imply that 
the price is more responsive to wind penetration rate in the case of fringe capacity. This 
means that the spot price decreases in the share of wind power faster if the owners of wind 
power capacity behaves competitively. In our example, integrating over all wind penetration 
rates the expected spot price is about 3% higher in the case of Cournot capacity compare to 
the case of fringe capacity. That is true for all three cases of wind diversification. 
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The role of spatial correlation can be examined by looking at the range spanned by the 
expected spot price in each case of wind diversification. While the average expected spot 
price is relatively comparable across all three cases, the coefficient of variation varies 
greatly; it is 0.02 for the case of fully diversified wind and 0.2 for the case of undiversified 
wind. Our result suggests that wind diversification is a significant factor in modeling the 
variance of the expected spot price in the day-ahead market. This is especially true 
considering the fact that we control for forecasted load and we use the same marginal pdf of 
local wind speed in all three cases of wind spatial correlation in our experiment. 
Premiums for electricity forward contracts are depicted in figure 28. The expected premium 
before the integration of wind power is 5.58% and diverge greatly afterwards. First, at 
relatively low wind penetration rates we observe a premium increase across all cases of 
ownership and wind diversification. Premiums for the Cournot capacity are larger than these 
under fringe capacity for all three levels of wind diversification. In particular, the maximum 
premiums for each ownership case are 8.6% and 7.1% respectively (figure 28, center). The 
difference in premiums becomes noticeable at about 10% wind penetration rate and exceeds 
a 5% gap at about 18.5% penetration rate for the cases of correlated wind. 
When the number of forwards traded becomes sufficiently high, the forward price converges 
to the expected spot price. This can be observed at the top graph in figure 28. When that 
happens the marginal forward contract provides no added value in expectations. On the other 
hand, in the case of fully diversified wind there is an interior solution for the number of 
forwards even when simulating 30% wind power capacity because high realizations of 
aggregate wind power are very unlikely (figure 28, bottom). For that reason, in this case IPPs 
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are more certain regarding the outcome of withholding capacity because high premiums are 
guaranteed with higher probability.  
Two main factors impact the change in electricity forward premiums due to an expansion of 
wind power capacity. These are the change in the probability of extreme realizations and the 
fact that IPPs compete for a smaller share of residual demand. First, the uncertainty regarding 
the availability of wind power preserves high prices because in the case of low wind 
additional generators would be turned on, driving spot price up. Second, the availability of 
wind power shifts production level downward, therefore at some point it becomes less 
profitable to withhold capacity.  
This increase in premiums takes place until wind power share is large enough to diminish 
IPPs ability to manipulate market prices. When this takes place more forwards are being 
traded (see figure 26) and the forward premium changes direction and starts declining (figure 
28). In the case of no spatial correlation the uncertainty introduced by wind is relatively small 
because aggregate wind forecasts are mapped into a small range of expected premium. On 
the other hand, for some degree of wind correlation the expected premium is sparse and 
depends on the aggregation of a particular set of local wind sites forecasting. 
 
Ownership of wind power capacity, generation costs and welfare distribution 
We seek to examine differences in outcomes for the case in which IPPs own wind power 
capacity and the case that wind capacity is owned by fringe firms. The two outcomes of 
interest are the costs of power generation and IPPs profits from non-wind power generation 
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units. We motivate the direct comparisons of equilibrium outcomes across cases on two 
grounds. First, the decision to invest in wind power capacity in the model is predetermined 
thereby seen as a sunk cost34. Also, the addition of ancillary services associated with the 
variability in wind power supply is administrated by the system operator and supplied by 
generators which do not take part in the markets for spot power. Therefore, investments and 
other costs related to the expansion of wind power capacity should not affect our comparison. 
Second, the demand for electricity in real-time is inelastic and does not respond to changes in 
prices. Therefore, the change in expenditure is the only parameter required for measuring 
changes in consumer surplus. Thus, we relate to the first outcome of interest as measuring 
how much the economy pays for generating power while the second stands for the changes in 
welfare distribution in electricity markets due to the integration of wind power capacity. 
For the cases that wind is correlated, the difference in the cost of generating power 
demonstrates a parabolic trend (figure 29, top and center). This trend also reflects how IPPs’ 
ability to exercise market power changes in wind penetration rate. IPPs’ market power 
initially rises due to the increase in LSEs’ financial risk and then decreases rapidly where 
generators compete for a smaller share to be produced by their conventional units. The 
average excess generation cost in the case of IPPs ownership of wind is 0.48% and 0.75% for 
the undiversified wind and for some degree of wind correlation, respectively. If wind is 
uncorrelated the range for forecasted wind penetration rate is between 11% and 14% and the 
                                                          
34
 Recent global trend of setting mandates along with various government financial supports for renewable 
energy made wind power production viable. A model of investments should take into consideration the fact that 
wind power capacity expansion is paid partly by consumers. 
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average excess cost is 0.90% compare to the fringe capacity case. These seemingly minor 
deviations may be substantial when considering energy efficiency in a regional scale. 
Looking at IPPs’ profits from non-wind power generation units the differences between the 
two cases of wind power ownership may be remarkable (figure 30). The average difference 
in the expected profits is 18.58%, 18.08% and 16.88% for full correlation, some correlation 
and zero wind correlation, respectively. In addition, the volatility of the difference in profits 
is very high if wind is undiversified and relatively dense in the case of fully diversified wind. 
If wind is correlated it is more likely that available wind power will account for a larger 
portion of regional power supply. When this happens, IPPs profits in the case that they own 
wind power capacity may be 40% above the fringe capacity case. The reason for that is the 
following: at a relatively high penetration rate the forward premium approaches zero in the 
fringe capacity case while it is still high in the Cournot capacity case. In periods when the 
expected share of wind power is above 20%, the difference decreases in wind penetration 
rate due to the decrease in IPPs ability to exercise market power at this range.  
Lastly, we performed further simulations to examine the sensitivity of our results to the 
possibility that the cost of generating power is higher than assumed in our experiments. 
When we employ x  3 (instead of 2) in the simulations the results are scaled up otherwise, 
they do not change much (figures 31-32). In this experiment, the costs of electricity in the 
case of Cournot capacity are higher by 0.73% to 1.30%, subject to wind diversification 
compare to the fringe capacity case. The difference in IPPs profits is on average about 
18.23% to 22.42% higher in the Cournot capacity case, subject to wind diversification. For 
periods where forecast approaches 20% wind penetration rate, the IPPs profits in the case 
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that IPPs own wind capacity may be more than 60% higher than the case of a fringe capacity 
(figure 32, center). Similar to previous results, this gap decreases at higher forecasted wind 
penetration rate. 
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Figure 29: Ratio between total short-run generation costs in the Cournot capacity case and fringe 
capacity case; full correlation (top) some correlation (middle) and zero correlation (bottom) 
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Figure 30: Ratio between IPPs’ profits from non-wind power generation units in the Cournot capacity 
case and fringe capacity case; full correlation (top) some correlation (middle) and zero correlation 
(bottom)  
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Figure 31: Ratio between total short-run generation costs in the Cournot capacity case and fringe 
capacity case, αþ  3; full correlation (top) some correlation (middle) and zero correlation (bottom) 
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Figure 32: Ratio between IPPs’ profits from non-wind power generation units in the Cournot capacity 
case and fringe capacity case, x  3; full correlation (top) some correlation (middle) and zero 
correlation (bottom)  
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Chapter summary 
Our simulations predict a large impact of wind power expansion on deregulated electricity 
markets. Our results depend on assumptions regarding ownership of wind power capacity 
and geographical diversification of wind power, but some model predictions are consistent 
through all scenarios. First, as wind penetration rate increases a substantial decrease in 
electricity spot price is expected. The parameters employed in our experiment imply that the 
decrease in the spot price due to wind power penetration rate is in the ratio of two to one (e.g. 
at 10% wind penetration rate we estimate about 20% decrease in the expected spot price). 
Notice however that this decrease is not translated into a net increase in consumer welfare. In 
fact, the expansion of wind power requires investments in wind capacity and additional 
ancillary service, which we do not model as we take the decision to expand wind power 
capacity as a predetermined policy in our short-run model. Second, we find that the forward 
premium increases in penetration rate due to the intermittent nature of wind power supply. 
However, when wind energy reaches a considerable share of regional power supply the 
forward premium starts to decline dramatically. This is because at some point net load is 
sufficiently small thus it is less profitable for IPPs to withhold capacity.  
When we examine the role of wind diversification we see that the smoothing effect in the 
region determines the range of possible realizations for the expected spot price, the number 
of forward contracts and the predictability of the forward premiums. Perhaps the most 
significant result with regard to wind spatial correlation is related to the notion that if wind is 
diversified (completely uncorrelated) it is with relatively low probability that aggregate wind 
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power supply meets its regional rated capacity. Consequently, production levels from 
conventional sources of energy almost never falls to the range where IPPs compete more 
aggressively in forward markets. Therefore, when wind power is diversified, the model 
predicts that IPPs profits from their non-wind power generators are higher than in the case of 
undiversified wind. Looking at the case where IPPs own wind power capacity these 
conclusions are even stronger. In this case it is in producers’ interest to withhold more 
conventional generation capacity compared to the case when they do not own wind power 
capacity. As a result, in this case less power is traded via forward contracts, expected spot 
price is higher and positive premiums sustain even when wind power accounts for more than 
20% of electricity consumption in expectations. Moreover, since with diversified wind it is 
almost for certain that wind power will never account for more than 15% of electricity 
consumption, the profits for IPPs in this case are substantially higher than the case that wind 
power in owned by competitive firms or if wind is spatially correlated. Our example shows 
excess profits for IPPs in the range of up to 40% when they own wind power capacity 
compare to the case that wind capacity is owned by competitive firms. In addition, we 
estimate expected losses of energy resources in the region in the range of 0.5%-0.9% (subject 
to wind diversification) if IPPs are the owners of wind power capacity. Finally, a sensitivity 
analysis show that if the cost of starting up generators is higher than assumed in our base 
case experiment the differences in IPPs profits and losses of energy resources between the 
two cases of ownership are even more substantial.  
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Chapter 7: General conclusions 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing 
deregulated electricity markets with wind energy. This is relevant since the state of 
knowledge for modeling electricity markets in insufficient for our purpose. While doing so, 
we are able to propose three main contributions. The first is the introduction of a novel 
equilibrium approach for modeling deregulated electricity markets. We develop a double-
sided auction model that explains for the first time, to the best of our knowledge, the 
coexistence of forward premiums and spot market mark-ups. That is a significant 
contribution since the two have been explained so far separately, by two conflicting modeling 
approaches. The body of literature explaining forward premiums is based on the assumptions 
of perfect competition and risk aversion. The main downside of this approach is that electric 
industries are concentrated by nature therefore it overlooks potential market failure caused by 
market power. In contrast, the expected outcome of taking an oligopoly modeling approach is 
spot market mark-ups. This is explained by producers’ incentive to withhold generation 
capacity. The drawback of this approach is the partial representation of the demand side in 
electricity markets, in particular, a lack of distinction between real-time load and the demand 
for forwards at the day-ahead market. Therefore, although this approach accounts for 
exercising market power it does not relate to the existence of forward premiums.  
The fact that both mark-ups and forward premiums are well documented in the empirical 
literature implies that the state of knowledge regarding modeling electricity markets is 
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incomplete. Our approach relies on two additional features describing the reality of 
deregulated electricity markets. First, the supply curve of electricity is dynamic due to 
ramping costs; frequent start-ups and shut-downs of generators increase the costs of 
generating power. Therefore, it is an important aspect of electricity pricing. Second, adequate 
regulation of the power system requires that scheduling power for future delivery relies on 
designated generators and their locations. This makes the market for short-term forwards 
illiquid since traders cannot make commitment to supply future power in the day-ahead 
market and secure the required amount only in the spot market. We show that by accounting 
for these fundamental elements of electricity markets our theoretical framework is capable of 
modeling oligopolistic competition, spot prices which are higher than the marginal costs of 
generating power and the existence of positive premiums in expectations. Moreover, we 
show that when we disregard ramping costs the predictions of our model coincide with the 
outcome that one would expect to see under perfect competition and the assumption of risk 
neutrality. 
Secondly, we expand the theoretical framework to account for the new economic 
environment of deregulated electricity markets with wind power. The integration of 
intermittent sources of energy introduces uncertainty from the supply side. This is an 
important addition to the model because it enables for the first time to integrate the 
characteristics of a renewable source of energy into an equilibrium modeling approach of 
electricity markets. In so doing, we also discuss the implications of a change in the industry 
structure due to the expansion of wind power capacity and geographical diversification of 
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wind power. The theoretical part of the study suggests that both issues may be fundamental 
for modeling wind-integrated markets. 
Our third contribution is related to the fact that wind power forecasting provides essential 
information for traders. The information of future availability of wind power is used to form 
expectations regarding spot market and risk management decisions. The ability to simulate 
this information is necessary for modeling traders’ behavior accurately in the day-ahead 
markets. We introduce a novel methodology that accounts for the joint distribution of wind 
speed and wind speed forecast for modeling the conditional distribution of regional wind 
power at the time of trading forwards. The simulation of regional wind power requires 
consideration of wind speed spatial correlation. Local wind speed raw data is described best 
by a Weibull distribution. However, so far researchers were using only approximations of the 
Weibull distribution in simulating the distribution of regional wind power. This is mainly 
because there is no a natural way to extend the case of a univariate Weibull to the 
multivariate case. For the purpose of imposing spatial correlation we make use of a technique 
introduced by Iman and Conover (1982). This technique is distribution free. Therefore it has 
a clear advantage for considerations of simulating regional wind speed. Our example in 
chapter 5 shows how to go about modeling the distribution of regional wind power supply 
starting with a fitted Weibull distribution to describe the distribution of local wind speed. 
The computational experiment in chapter 6 provides intuition regarding future expansion of 
wind power capacity. The outcomes in wind-integrated electricity markets depend to a great 
extent on the industry structure and the distribution of wind power output in the region. 
Relatively more concentrated electric industries are expected to generate higher profits for 
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IPPs as wind penetration rate increases. In the case that IPPs are also the owners of wind 
power capacity the integration of wind power would enhance their profits significantly 
compare to the case that wind capacity is owned by competitive firms. Also, we show that 
these excess profits are generated by inefficient employment of energy resources. In periods 
that wind penetration rate approaches the rated capacity IPPs are less likely to withhold 
capacity. This is true because in this case IPPs compete on a smaller residual demand. The 
main impact of wind diversification is the ability of wind energy, as an uncontrolled source 
of power, to reduce IPPs market power. Our results show that in the extreme case that wind 
power is fully correlated realizations of high wind power supply have relatively high 
probability. Under this circumstance, IPPs compete more aggressively because their ability to 
manipulate market prices is relatively low. If wind is less spatially correlated the likelihood 
of high wind penetration rate is lower therefore residual demand is relatively higher which in 
turn allows IPPs to exercise more market power.  
 
Future research 
A possible extension of the model would examine the impact of developing better batteries 
for energy storage. Making the storage of electricity economically viable will have two 
significant impacts. First, from regulation perspective the power system would be able to 
handle the variation of wind energy better therefore it would be possible to integrate more 
wind power capacity to the system. Second, storage would have a direct impact on electricity 
pricing. It is expected that the batteries would not be used in all times but only when the spot 
price is high enough to justify the cost of storage. In order for our model to account for this, 
170 
 
 
 
one would need to incorporate a truncated distribution for the spot price. This corresponds to 
the idea that expected spikes in demand can be met by power produced in base load periods 
when the cost of generating power is relatively low. With an upper bar on the spot price, 
demand for hedging risk via forward contracts is reduced. As a result, it is not just that the 
expected spot price of electricity is lower, but producers facing lower demand curve for 
forwards would have less incentive to withhold generation capacity. 
Another extension for our model may include investments decisions in wind power capacity. 
This would allow performing a full welfare analysis of the problem in hand. Our results make 
it obvious that there are large welfare implications for policy that support wind power 
capacity. Nowadays, wind energy enjoys considerable public support. The fact that global 
expansion of wind power is being subsidized by consumers makes this question most 
relevant. Our study shows that in addition to lowering electricity prices, wind power may 
help diminish market power. A complete welfare analysis may define the conditions under 
which public support is required to correct for a market failure and what are the 
circumstances in which subsidizing wind power becomes only a question of income 
redistribution. 
Lastly, the current design of electricity markets is based on the two-settlement process (i.e. 
day-ahead and spot markets). With considerable amount of wind power capacity it may be 
required to reconsider the time for trading forward contracts. Forecasting load at the day-
ahead market is relatively accurate, but it is still inefficient to forecast the availability of wind 
power for more than several hours ahead. Therefore, in markets that accommodate a large 
share of wind power it may be better to consider a new gate closure for trade in electricity 
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forwards. Our model can be used for this purpose as long as forecasting precisions of load 
and wind power at the proposed time of trading forwards are known. However, such an 
analysis should take into consideration the system constraints and the costs of scheduling 
conventional generators closer to the time of the delivery period. These should be added to 
the model as it is beyond the scope of our study. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Contract For Differences 
The stochastic nature of load gives rise to realizations where actual electricity demand is 
lower than the amount settled for delivery via forward contracts. In this case the excess 
amount cannot and will not be produced for physical and economical reasons. Physically, the 
excess amount causes transmission and reliability problems in the power system. These and 
the associated costs are not treated in this study. Economically, surplus of electricity cannot 
characterize equilibrium in electricity markets. Therefore, one would expect that a financial 
settlement which enables the buy-out of surplus be part of electricity market operation. Next, 
we show why a Contract for Differences (CFD) in particular may be an instrument to solve 
for the missing market problem and eliminate surplus of power supply. 
LSE’s willingness to resell excess forward contracts is obvious since electricity cannot be 
economically stored. For an IPP firm, we compare the economic payoff from generating the 
volume traded via forward contracts versus generating the exact realized load with 
accordance to a CFD settlement. Recall that in the event that load happens to be lower than 
the amount scheduled in advance the supply curve corresponds to the cost of a more efficient 
production regime. This curve is depicted in figure 33 by óc. The less efficient production 
regime of a higher load realization is depicted by the portion of the supply curve denoted 
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as ó^. Also in the figure, Ã and  denote the amounts of power traded via forward contracts 
and a (lower) realized amount which a particular LSE responsible to deliver respectively. 
Generating the entire amount traded in advance, the IPP is paid the forward price 
c. In 
figure 33 we depicted 
c as the competitive price, assuming for now that there are no 
forward premiums in expectations (we relax that assumption later). Notice that regardless of 
the existence of a CFD, the illustrated realization provides the IPP with an extra producer 
surplus of 
cZ:
x (compare to the standard surplus created by the spot price 
x). If load is 
produced up to the entire volume traded via forward contracts, 
c coincides with the 
marginal cost and the area Z: is added to the producer surplus. On the other hand, if the 
IPP can buy back the excess contracts for the (expected) spot market price35, the added 
producer surplus is the area ABCD L Z:.  
For the case of positive forwards premium, simply increase 
c to show that for the same 
level of Ã the producer surplus will be larger than in the case of zero premiums in 
expectations. In solving the model we showed that negative premiums in expectations are not 
possible in this market. Therefore, it is clear that both LSEs and IPPs benefit from trading a 
CFD. Thus we establish that a financial settlement such as a CFD is expected to be part of a 
market clearing condition. 
  
                                                          
35
 Assuming that the spot price is a benchmark for trading excess supply is appropriate since in reality market 
participants balance quantities in the spot markets. 
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Figure 33: The two-settlement process in the case of over-trading 
forward contracts  
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Appendix 2: SOC for the IPPs problem 
The second derivative of ´ with respect to the number of forward contracts is 
)´c ) 
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
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(2.35)  
Notice that 
1) ?	·l   0 and  ll   0,  
2) Ä ?	·l∑ l·½¾,± Ilj reh¬hfh  0, which is to say that in the event that no 
additional generators are turned on after the forwards market is cleared the spot price 
is not affected by the marginal forward contract. 
Therefore we can write 
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Substitute for  ?	·l   J|  , and ll  | |  JJIJ we get 
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Substituting for the derivative of the forward price 
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which is negative for any positive integers of 8 and g. Therefore, ´ is strictly concave 
in c , thus we know that if there is an interior symmetric solution it has to be unique.  
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Appendix 3: Wind turbine used in this study 
The power curve of a wind turbine used throughout this study is modeled in attempt to mimic 
the characteristics of a particular commercial 1.5 MW wind turbine. 
Table 7: Wind turbine technical data 
Rated power (RP) 1,500 kW 
Cut-in wind speed 3.5 m/s 
Rated wind speed 14 m/s 
Cut-out wind speed 25 m/s 
Rotor diameter 77 m 
Hub height 80 m 
 
The turbine’s output is expressed as  
 
=	+   0 .r 3.5 w +Ø	+ Ã t
 .r 25 w + L 3.50 .r + L 25 z (3.13) 
where the function describing the efficiency coefficient is  
 Ø	+  Φ	+ .r 14 w + L 3.51 .r 25 w + L 140 FF z (3.14) 
and Φ	+ is a normal cumulative density function (cdf) to be fitted by eye to the power 
curve of the desired wind turbine.  
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In figure 19 we depict a power curve generated by using a normal cdf with mean 7.9 and 
variance 2.2. This fitted power curve is depicted in chapter 3 and also being used for 
numerical purposes in the rest of this study. 
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Figure 34: Fitted power curve of a 1.5MW wind turbine to be used in this study 
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